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Abstract 
 
What basic cues are available from a young age to determine item value? How do these 
cues influence evaluative decisions about items (including how to distribute them to others)? The 
work described in this dissertation begins to address these questions, in a series of seven studies 
with 943 child and adult participants.  
In Chapter 2, I report three studies testing whether children (4-12 years) and adults show 
a direct motivation to select scarce and varied sets of items (i.e., select items for the sake of 
obtaining something scarce and/or something varied). In this series of studies, participants saw 
sets of novel items and selected one (Scarcity task) or two (Variety task) that they would like for 
themselves and/or someone else; no additional information beyond relative availability was 
provided. Results revealed a clear, early-emerging preference for variety. In contrast, no clear 
preference for scarce items was observed, suggesting that a preference for scarce items is 
acquired later and/or contextually-dependent. This latter finding is particularly informative given 
an oft-made assumption that scarcity increases item value. 
In Chapter 3, I report four studies designed to reveal the mechanisms underlying a variety 
preference. In Study 4, I tested whether children (6-9 years) and adults valued varied sets more 
than non-varied sets monetarily, which would suggest that a preference for variety is rooted in 
the added value it confers. Results revealed that participants indeed placed a higher value on 
varied compared to non-varied sets. However, results from Study 5 with children (6-9 years) and 
adults suggest that the added value assigned to variety is not due to variety per se, but likely to 
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the diminished utility of additional units of the same item in non-varied sets (i.e., additional units 
of an item are less valuable than the previous). In Studies 6 and 7, I tested whether children (4-9 
years) and adults would forego an additional unit of a preferred item in order to obtain a varied 
set of foods (e.g., if carrots are preferred to broccoli, will a participant forego a second carrot to 
select broccoli and thus obtain a varied set of foods?). Results revealed that in the absence of a 
preference for one food over another, participants selected varied food sets more than non-varied 
food sets, thus conceptually replicating results from Studies 1-3. In contrast, when one food item 
was preferred over another, participants did not preferentially select varied food sets. Together, 
these results suggest that a preference for an individual item can override a preference for 
variety. 
Overall, these seven studies shed light on how children 4-12 years determine item value 
using two basic cues, scarcity and variety, and inform our understanding of the strength and 
limits of a variety preference in childhood. More generally, results from the present work 
demonstrate that young children systematically use variety as a cue to value, which has 
implications for our understanding of children as consumers more broadly.  
 
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Children are faced with the major task of learning how to engage in economic exchange, 
as exchange is foundational to being a functioning member of society. For adults, exchanges are 
ubiquitous not only in economic contexts (buying, selling, trading), but also relevant within legal 
contexts (e.g., bribes, fines, dissolving partnerships) and social interactions (e.g., gift-giving, 
reciprocating favors, or teaming up to provide support for a community member in need; see 
Fiske, 1991). In short, determining when, how, and how much to offer in exchange for goods is 
an important and complex puzzle, and children will spend years figuring out how to engage in 
these processes effectively. Nonetheless, although children lack sophisticated understanding of 
economic principles and the larger social structures in which they are based, they begin to 
engage in economic exchange from an early age. Preschool children trade cards, toys, or snacks 
with one another, and may even engage in simple economic transactions (e.g., getting an 
allowance or buying small items at the store). In all of these contexts, children (and adults) are 
required to determine the value of the individual items that are the basis of that exchange (i.e., 
item value is required for determining which exchanges are fair or reasonable, and which are 
not). Although this may seem like such a basic prerequisite skill that it hardly needs mention, a 
closer examination of the problem reveals that determining individual item value can be a 
complex calculation.  
As adults, we regularly incorporate many different sources of information into our 
determinations of item value. For example, we often consider item popularity and adjust value 
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based on whether an item is in high or low demand. At the same time, we may also consider the 
relative availability of an item. Items easy to obtain may be valued less than items more difficult 
to obtain. Similarly, the effort required to create or procure an item may influence its value. 
Items difficult to create or obtain may be valued more than items easier to create or obtain. More 
often than not, it is likely that we incorporate many pieces of information to converge on a value 
for an individual item. For example, if someone is interested in determining the value of a 
diamond ring in a gold band, they may consider the ring’s history, to consider how much 
sentimental value it would have for its owner; they may consider its style, to determine if it 
matches their own identity as a self-styled traditionalist; they may consider the reputation of the 
designer, to determine its potential resale value; they may consider how difficult it was to create, 
to consider what would be reasonable recompense to the artisan; they may consider the source of 
the stone, to judge the moral implications of supporting the diamond-mining industry; and they 
may turn to the market to identify the current price per ounce of gold (a computation associated 
with supply and demand) and then make adjustments based on the ring’s quality and our desire 
to sell. These sorts of complex valuation processes may not be available to young children, 
especially given their difficulties understanding and incorporating market forces such as supply 
and demand into determinations of value (Leiser & Halachmi, 2006; Siegler & Thompson, 1998; 
Thompson & Siegler, 2000). 
 This dissertation asks whether and when in development children make use of cues to 
determine item value that are very basic—so basic that they can be gleaned directly without 
having to appeal to any of the sorts of factors described above (e.g., history, style, source, 
designer, creative effort, financial markets, etc., all of which would rely on information to which 
children have relatively little if any access). By taking a developmental approach, I can discern 
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when in development children make systematic use of cues readily available in the context to 
determine item value. It is possible that early on, children’s valuations reflect whim and are thus 
neither predictable nor stable. It is also possible that children’s valuations are stable but reflect 
idiosyncratic experiences or personal preferences (e.g., selecting items on the basis of their 
favorite color, or those that remind them of objects they already own). In contrast, however, 
there may be meaningful, predictable cues that young children use systematically to determine 
value. Two candidate cues include scarcity and variety. Scarce items are relatively less available 
than others in a given context (e.g., given 1 red marble and 5 blue marbles, the red marble would 
be scarce). Varied items are those that differ within a set (e.g., given a choice of 2 marbles 
among 3 red and 3 blue marbles, a varied set would be 1 red and 1 blue). By preschool age, 
children have acquired the skills necessary to determine when items are scarce (i.e., they can 
detect whether there is more or less of something compared to something else) and when sets are 
varied (i.e., they can detect when items differ vs. when they are the same) (Odic, Pietroski, 
Hunter, Lidz, & Halberda, 2013; Shipley & Shepperson, 2006).  
 Though scarcity and variety have received much attention in the adult literature, there is 
surprisingly little evidence on the use of these cues in childhood. In addition, prior work on 
scarcity with adults yields inconclusive results. Whereas some reports suggest that scarce items 
have inherent value due to their scarcity (e.g., Brock, 1968; Cialdini, 2008; Lynn, 1991; Mittone 
& Savadori, 2009) other reports suggest that scarce items are valued only under certain market 
conditions (e.g., when they are scarce because they were popular and thus sold well) (e.g., 
Verhallen & Robben, 1994; Worchel, Lee, & Adewole, 1975). These mixed results may reflect 
the fact that scarcity can signal both added value and a lack of value (e.g., at the grocery store, 
truffles are scarce and expensive because they are difficult to produce; beets may be similarly 
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scarce, but due to low demand, and thus are priced much lower). Contrastingly, prior work on 
variety shows that adults are motivated to obtain variety for the sake of doing so (e.g., McAlister 
& Pessemier, 1982; Kahn, 1995; Ratner, Kahn, Kahneman, 1999). Motivations to select variety 
for the sake of obtaining it include managing satiation (i.e., limiting boredom associated with an 
item; maximizing utility) and managing uncertainty (i.e., preparing for future unknown needs by 
diversifying selections) (Kahn, 1995; McAlister, 1982).  
The present studies 
 The present studies examine children’s use of scarcity and variety over development. 
Given the utility of variety, and the fact that variety is informative in and of itself, I predicted 
that preference for variety would emerge early in development, as evidenced by higher rates of 
selection and greater valuation of varied vs. non-varied sets of items. Contrastingly, given the 
relative uninformativeness of scarcity (e.g., scarcity can signal greater value when caused by 
high demand and thus supplies selling out, but it can signal lower value when caused by low 
demand and thus lower rates of production), I predicted that preference for scarcity would be 
lower or slower to develop, as evidenced by lower rates of selection and lower valuation of 
scarce vs. non-scarce items.  
Across these dissertation studies, I focus on children 4-12 years of age, with added 
emphasis on children 6-9 years. This range captures children with and without schooling 
experience, where explicit instruction on economic issues may be formalized. For example, 
economic instruction begins in kindergarten in the state of Michigan (Michigan Department of 
Education, 2018). In addition, children across this range dramatically increase in their 
understanding of market forces such as supply and demand, which could influence use of variety 
and/or scarcity as cues to value. Adults are included as a comparison group to assess the nature 
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and stability of results across time. By taking a developmental approach to the study of scarcity 
and variety, the research reported in this dissertation has implications for the robustness of 
assumptions that have been made in the literature (e.g., that scarcity automatically confers higher 
value), and permits testing different theories for the patterns that have been obtained (e.g., 
motivations to select variety), most of which have so far been based on findings with adults. 
Much of the prior work on the use of scarcity and variety as cues to value focuses on how these 
cues influence adults’ decision making. It is unclear whether children make use of these cues in 
similar ways, or whether use of these cues develops over time.  
 To test children’s preferences for scarce and varied sets of items (Studies 1-3; Chapter 2), 
I asked children to select among sets each comprising two kinds of items differing in their 
relative availability. To limit the use of a priori preferences for certain features (e.g., color, size), 
items were unfamiliar and novel, and items within sets were the same color. In this way, I could 
better isolate the influence of scarcity (relative availability) and variety on selections for the self 
and others, and test whether scarce items and varied sets were selected more than non-scarce 
items and non-varied sets. Results revealed that children and adults showed a strong and 
consistent preference for varied sets, whereas they showed little to no preference for scarce 
items. These data are published in the Journal of Experimental Child Psychology (Echelbarger & 
Gelman, 2017).  
 Given the robust selection of variety observed in Studies 1-3, I further tested the strength 
and limits of this preference. In Studies 4-5 (Chapter 3), children indicated how much people 
would pay for different sets comprising the same items used in Studies 1-3. Requiring monetary 
valuations allowed me to directly assess value in a way not possible in Studies 1-3. In Study 6 
(Chapter 3), I tested whether children would forego a preferred item to obtain a varied set. Study 
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6 offers an even stronger test of the variety preference because participants selected among 
consumable (food) items where additional units of the same item were likely to be devalued less 
than durable items (e.g., one can make use of multiple food items in a single sitting, whereas 
with durable items such as a cup, one can often use just one at a time). Thus, by using 
consumable items, I could test whether the results observed in Studies 1-3 extended to a different 
type of item (i.e., consumable vs. durable). Lastly, Study 7 (Chapter 3) served as a control study 
with adults, testing whether the order in which preference were elicited influenced variety 
selections. 
As an interdisciplinary project—one bridging psychology, marketing, and behavioral 
sciences—this dissertation offers, to my knowledge, the first test of children’s direct motivations 
to select scarce and varied sets of items (i.e., selections made for the sake of obtaining something 
scarce or varied, and not a consequence of some other factor, such as popularity). Taken 
together, results from these seven studies provide the first evidence that preference for variety 
emerges early (as early as 4-5 years), whereas preference for scarcity does not (at least when 
assessed via minimal context), and that this preference is associated with added monetary value 
in childhood. In addition, children’s systematic use of variety, as observed across multiple 
contexts, offers at least one avenue by which they can determine item value, contributing to what 
we know about children and exchange. Contrastingly, children’s relative inattention to scarcity 
suggests that the oft-made assumption that scarcity confers higher value is tenuous at best. 
Findings across all studies point to several exciting opportunities for future work. 
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Chapter 2: The Value of Variety and Scarcity Across Development 
 
A fundamental task that children face is determining the value of items that they 
encounter. The ability to determine item value has implications for how much effort to devote 
toward obtaining or retaining an item, determining what constitutes a fair distribution of 
resources, and choosing whether or not to engage in disputes. It is thus important to understand 
how children determine item value, and specifically which cues they use at different points in 
development. Certainly for adults, value is influenced by numerous factors that reflect domain-
specific knowledge, including an item’s function (e.g., a functional clock has higher value than a 
broken clock), one’s current needs and desires (e.g., a bottle of water has higher value when one 
is thirsty than when one is not), and market forces (e.g., a property has greater value when the 
housing market is on an upswing). Importantly, however, additional cues to value may be 
gleaned simply and straightforwardly from the distribution of items in a given context, even 
without consideration of domain-specific knowledge. Two such cues include variety and 
scarcity.  
 Variety refers to differences among items within a set. For example, a gift bag containing 
a keychain and a mug is more varied than one containing either two keychains or two mugs. 
Adults tend to seek out and prefer variety (e.g., Maimaran & Wheeler, 2008; Mittelman, 
Andrade, Chattopadhyay, & Brendl, 2014; Ratner et al., 1999; Read & Loewenstein, 1995; 
Simonson, 1990; see Kahn, 1995 for review), although there are different explanatory accounts 
of this preference. McAlister and Pessemier (1982) note that variety seeking can be a motivation 
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in and of itself (direct), or it can emerge as a result of some other motivation (derived). Direct 
motivations that have been proposed include a hedge against future uncertainty and utility 
maximization (Kahn, 1995). By obtaining varied items, we can better equip ourselves to manage 
future needs, which are by definition unknown. Furthermore, variety allows us to maximize 
utility (or “manage satiation”), in that repeated consumption of similar items can result in 
decreased utility for each subsequent item (Fishbach, Ratner, & Zhang, 2010; McAlister, 1982). 
Both hedging against uncertainty and utility maximization have clear evolutionary advantages 
and thus may be available from early in development. 
 Although a preference for variety is well-established in adults, much less is known about 
if/when this preference emerges in childhood. Previous work explored individual differences in 
variety seeking in the food domain (Nicklaus, Boggio, Chabanet, & Issanchou, 2005), finding 
that children use variety to guide their choices (Just, Lund, & Price, 2012; Roe, Meengs, Birch, 
& Rolls, 2013). However, previous work has not tested whether variety, in and of itself, is a 
preference. For example, although children are more likely to consume more varied snacks (e.g., 
apple, peach, pineapple) than uniform snacks (e.g., pineapple), this could reflect that varied 
snacks are more likely to include a more favored food. In other words, increased consumption in 
the context of variety may reflect the greater value of particular items (derived value) rather than 
a value placed on variety per se (direct value).  
 Scarcity refers to the relative infrequency of an item, whether or not it is unique (the only 
one of its kind). For example, if a set of prizes includes five keychains and one mug, the mug 
would be scarce and unique; if the set includes four keychains and two mugs, the mugs would be 
scarce but not unique. As with variety, a preference for scarcity could be derived or direct. 
Commodity theory suggests that scarcity has direct value: "any commodity will be valued to the 
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extent that it is scarce, unavailable, or difficult to attain" (Brock, 1968, p. 246). Some of the 
derived mechanisms that result in scarcity selections include a preference for unique (Snyder & 
Fromkin, 1980), popular (e.g., Verhallen 1982; Verhallen & Robben, 1994; Worchel et al., 
1975), higher-priced (Lynn, 1991), or authentic items (Frazier, Gelman, Wilson, & Hood, 2009; 
Newman, Disendruck, & Bloom, 2011), as well as a desire to signal an owner’s uniqueness or 
status (Gierl & Huettl, 2010). Although there is some evidence that direct motivations result in 
scarcity selections (e.g., adults in Worchel et al., 1975, preferred scarce cookies to abundant 
cookies; see Mittone & Savadori, 2009, for review), scarce items do not always receive greater 
value (Sehnert, Franks, Yap, & Higgins, 2014), and the strength of this preference is often 
weaker than derived motivations, such as the preference for popular items.   
 Although much less is known about children’s use of scarcity, recent work found that 
children prefer scarce items under conditions that we would characterize as reflecting a derived 
motivation. For example, preschoolers prefer items with distinctive (rare) histories (Gelman, 
Frazier, Noles, Manczak, & Stilwell, 2015) and prefer to allocate rare (scarce) items to preferred 
puppets (although scarcity was confounded with variety) (Chernyak & Sobel, 2016). We are 
aware of only one study demonstrating a direct motivation for scarcity in children: namely, 
preschoolers preferred the scarce choice when the two types of items in a set were visually 
distinct from one another (e.g., red vs. green apples), although not when they were visually 
similar (e.g., two similar kinds of crackers; the authors term this a “visual minority effect”; 
Maimaran & Salant, 2016). Interestingly, this scarcity preference was obtained in preschoolers 
but not adults. Altogether, then, there is intriguing initial evidence that children may use scarcity 
to guide their valuations and choices, although the breadth and consistency of this preference is 
unknown.  
 10 
Present Research 
 The present research is designed to examine whether and when children prefer scarcity 
and variety, with adults as a comparison group. As noted earlier, it is important to explore which 
principles guide valuations and to determine when preferences for different items emerge. By 
doing so, we can know better what is most basic in human choice behaviors, and ultimately, 
economic judgments. We focus on direct motivations for variety and scarcity, rather than derived 
motivations—that is, a preference for variety and/or scarcity per se, unconfounded with other 
factors. Therefore, we provide a simple choice, asking participants to view sets of novel items, 
consisting of two different kinds of items in sets of six. In the Scarcity task, participants had an 
opportunity to select either a scarce item or an abundant item; in the Variety task, participants 
had an opportunity to select either two varied items, or two non-varied items. On both tasks, all 
items were unfamiliar in order to limit pre-existing preferences or real-world knowledge. 
Further, we provided no additional information about the items (including their identity, 
function, or origins), their distribution (no reasons were provided or even implied for why some 
items were more or less scarce), or the context of the selection (neither scarcity nor variety were 
highlighted in any way).   
 The sparse nature of this task has the advantage of allowing us to test whether the relative 
availability of the items per se influences participants’ choice behavior. In order to understand 
how different cues are weighted, and how different cues uniquely influence decisions, we must 
first understand how they are used independent of each other. Prior work, particularly as it 
relates to scarcity, typically either confounded these preferences or included additional cues 
which may have accounted for the results. Thus, we opted for the current design using novel 
items. At the same time, this raises the important question of whether, and if so how, the present 
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results would extend to more complex, real-world settings. In the General Discussion we return 
to this point. 
 We manipulated the relative availability of each of the two types of items in each set by 
including three ratios: 5:1, 4:2, and 3:3. For the Scarcity task, 5:1 trials provide one uniquely 
scarce item, 4:2 trials provide two scarce items but no uniquely scarce item, and 3:3 trials do not 
permit a test of scarcity (as there are no scarce items). For the Variety task, 5:1 trials permit 
participants to select either varied or non-varied items, when selecting variety includes selecting 
the scarce item. For 4:2 trials, participants can again select varied or non-varied items; however, 
selecting non-variety could include either two scarce items or two abundant items. Finally, for 
3:3 trials, participants can select varied or non-varied items, and there is no scarce item. Thus, 
across these three ratios, we are able to examine preferences for uniquely scarce items (5:1), 
scarce items more generally (4:2), and variety (5:1, 4:2, and 3:3). Importantly, by including 3:3 
trials in the Variety task, we are able to deconfound any preference for variety that may be due to 
a scarcity preference (e.g., variety selection in the 5:1 case could in actuality be due to a scarcity 
preference), as no scarce item is present during these trials. 
Predictions 
 Both variety and scarcity may signal item value to young children. First, both cues are 
readily gleaned from simply observing sets of items, even wholly novel items. Second, prior 
research demonstrates that by preschool age, children are capable of detecting both relative 
quantity (scarcity) and degree of similarity (variety), when considering sets of items (Odic et al., 
2013; Shipley, & Shepperson, 2006). Third, neither cue incorporates contextual influences like 
market forces, which can be difficult for young children to understand (Leiser & Halachmi, 
2006; Siegler & Thompson, 1998; Thompson & Siegler, 2000). However, despite the availability 
 12 
of these cues early in development, we posit that variety and scarcity may function quite 
differently from one another.  
 Variety is hypothesized to be a powerful cue even early in childhood, given arguments 
concerning adults’ motivations for selecting variety (i.e., hedging against uncertainty, managing 
satiation), and the clear evolutionary advantages associated with those motivations. In contrast, 
we hypothesized that scarcity, in and of itself, would not signal value to young children. Our 
basic reasoning is that the meaning of scarcity is highly variable, depending on its underlying 
cause. Although scarcity signals positive value in many contexts (e.g., popular goods may be 
bought faster and thus become scarce), scarcity can also signal lack of value (e.g., less desirable 
items may be less often produced and thus be scarce), or even no relation to value (e.g., a store 
may have accidentally ordered more of one kind of pencil than another, yielding differences in 
quantity but no differences in value). Thus, although high-value items may be scarce (e.g., the 
first edition of a Shakespeare folio), it is also the case that high-value items may be abundant 
(e.g., there are many more copies of Meet the Beatles than there are of Paris, Paris Hilton’s 
debut studio album).  
 In Study 1, we explicitly tested whether children (in age groups ranging from 4-12 years) 
and adults prefer scarcity and variety. If participants view scarce items as more valuable than 
non-scarce items, then they should select scarce items for themselves significantly above chance. 
Similarly, if participants view varied items as more valuable than non-varied items, they should 
select varied items for themselves significantly above chance. If a preference for variety is 
foundational and early emerging, whereas a preference for scarcity is more context-dependent, 
then across participants, variety should be selected at a higher rate than scarcity. In Study 2, 
participants selected items for both themselves and someone else. By introducing another 
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(unknown) recipient, we reasoned that the context would prompt participants to engage in social 
comparison (Sheskin, Bloom, & Wynn, 2014; Steinbeis & Singer, 2012) and thus maximize 
benefits for themselves at the expense of others. Consequently, we expected that in Study 2, 
selections based on scarcity and variety would increase. Finally, Study 3 serves as a control 
condition for Study 2, by testing whether children and adults prefer scarcity and variety for 
someone else, without the social comparison. Exploring preferences for scarcity and variety in 
this way will inform our understanding of how children evaluate the value of items around them. 
STUDY 1 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants included 97 children 4 to 12 years of age, subdivided into four age groups: 4-
5 years (n = 24, M = 4.95 years, SD = 0.55 years, 12 females, 12 males), 6-7 years (n = 28, M = 
7.08 years, SD = 0.55 years, 18 females, 10 males), 8-9 years (n = 24, M = 8.89 years, SD = 0.59 
years, 12 females, 12 males), and 10-12 years (n = 21, M = 11.24 years, SD = 0.73 years, 12 
females, 9 males). According to parent report, the majority of children were White (85%). 
Participants also included 48 adults (M = 35 years, SD = 10 years, 28 females, 20 males; 85% 
White). Sixteen additional children 3-5 years of age (M = 3.96 years, SD = 0.70 years, 6 females, 
10 males) participated in a pretest only. An additional 3 children were excluded due to 
experimenter error. Two adults were excluded for failing attentional control trials.   
Children were recruited and tested in a lab space at a local museum and library in the 
Midwest United States. Adults were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). To be 
eligible to participate, adult MTurk workers must have obtained “Master Worker” status, have 
had an approval rating greater than or equal to 95, have completed at least 1000 approved tasks, 
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and have been located in the United States. All children received a small thank-you gift for 
participating. Adults were compensated $0.50, a competitive rate for a task of this length. 
Materials 
 Materials included photographs of 24 novel items taken from the Novel Objects and 
Unusual Names Database (Horst & Hout, 2016). Although novel, these items were photographs 
of actual objects (including a variety of tools, toys, and other artifacts). In addition, 16 familiar 
items (e.g., piggy bank, bucket, umbrella) were used in the warm-up, taken from online image 
sources (Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Olivia, 2008, 2013). Novel items were divided into 12 pairs. 
Items within pairs were edited to be the same color, to avoid selections based on a preference for 
a particular color; six colors were used across the 12 pairs (red, orange, yellow, green, blue, 
purple). The familiar items were used in four warm-up trials. 
 Because the study included displaying items in a matrix, we pretested two orientations to 
determine if a 2x3 matrix or a 1x6 matrix would be easier for children to scan for relative 
numerosity. Specifically, children were asked to indicate which item in each set was more 
frequent (“Are there more Xs or Os, or are there the same?”) for the ratios 5:1 and 4:2. Children 
were slightly, though non-significantly, more accurate on 2x3 matrices than 1x6 matrices 
(87.50% vs. 82.80%; t[15] = 1.86, p = .083). We thus used the 2x3 matrix for all item sets.  
Pictures of objects were affixed to laminated pages using Velcro

. Each experimental trial 
included six total tokens of two novel items types (i.e., each page had six pictures total; see 
Figure 1).  
Design  
Participants selected either one or two items per trial for themselves, in counterbalanced 
blocks. Within each block, participants saw two trials each of the following ratios: 5:1, 4:2, 3:3. 
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Trials within blocks were randomized using pre-generated orders (Excel RAND function). The 
presentation of item pairs in each ratio was counterbalanced such that, across participants, item 
pairs appeared equally in each block and each ratio (e.g., 5A:1B, 1A:5B, 4A:2B, 2A:4B, 3A:3B, 
3B:3A, where A and B are different item types). The location of scarce items was 
counterbalanced across item pairs. Scarce items appeared in either the upper right hand or lower 
left hand corners of the matrices, in order to make it easier for participants to detect them (once 
in each location per ratio per block, as depicted in Figure 1). Note that when selecting one item, 
it was not possible to select a scarce item during 3:3 trials, and thus they were not analyzed. 
However, we included such trials to make the sets of items identical across conditions and 
studies.   
Procedure 
 Children. After receiving parental consent and providing verbal assent, each child met 
with an experimenter individually and was told that they were going to look at some pictures and 
make some choices. Children were instructed to choose one or two items (depending on the 
block) for themselves and place them in the bowl: “Choose one thing that you would like for 
yourself” or “Choose two things that you would like for yourself.” This required children to 
detach the pictures from the pages in the book (as pictures were attached by Velcro

). Children 
were corrected if they selected the wrong number of items but otherwise received no feedback, 
on either warm-up or test trials.   
Children first completed two warm-up trials to ensure that they were comfortable 
selecting the number of items required, and were comfortable leaving items unselected. During 
warm-up trials, the number of pictures affixed to each page differed depending on the number of 
items being selected in that particular block. When selecting one item, three familiar items were 
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affixed to each warm-up page (two trials total); when selecting two items, five familiar items 
were affixed to each warm-up page (two trials total). Items were placed in a collection bowl 
situated near the child. 
Following the warm-up, children received 12 trials, 6 per block. The locations of each 
choice were recorded to determine which items were chosen. 
 Adults. Adults completed an electronic survey analogous to that which children received, 
using the same items, pairs, and orientations. Although adults were not required to complete 
warm-up trials, they were required to successfully answer two attention trials (e.g., select the 
letter P).  
Results 
The analyses examined whether and when children and adults preferred scarcity and 
variety. One set of analyses examined scarcity and variety for 5:1 and 4:2 trials. The 3:3 trials 
were assessed separately to determine whether any preference for variety extended to contexts 
where no scarce item was present. This was important to test, because in the 5:1 and 4:2 trials, 
selections of a varied set may reflect a preference for the scarce item. For each participant, we 
counted the number of trials that a scarce item was chosen during 5:1 and 4:2 trials when 
selecting one item, and the number of trials that varied items were selected (one of each item 
type) during 5:1, 4:2, and 3:3 trials when selecting two items. For each ratio, there were two 
trials, and thus two opportunities to choose scarce or varied items. Scores for each trial-type 
ranged from 0 to 2. Once scores were tallied, we calculated proportions for each ratio in each 
condition (range: 0-1).  
Scarcity and Variety Compared Directly 
 We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with ratio (5:1, 4:2) and task (Scarcity, 
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Variety) as the within-participants factors, and age group (4-5, 6-7, 8-9, 10-12, Adults) as the 
between-participants factor. This analysis yielded main effects of task, F(1, 140) = 88.88, p < 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .39, and ratio, F(1, 140) = 11.38, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08. However, these main effects are 
interpreted in the context of two interactions that emerged: task × age group, F(4, 140) = 4.08, p 
= .004, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .10, and ratio × age group, F(4, 140) = 2.64, p = .036, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07. Overall, participants 
selected varied sets (.80) more than scarce items (.52). A Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons was used for each post-hoc analysis, resulting in a more stringent alpha level of .01 
(.05/5 age groups). Post-hoc analyses revealed that this difference reached significance for 
children 6-7 years (.94 vs. .51), children 8-9 years (.80 vs. .49), and Adults (.85 vs. .47) (ps < 
.001), but not for children 4-5 years (.64 vs. .50) or 10-12 years (.76 vs. .62) (ps = .054 and .057, 
respectively). Further, scarce and varied items were selected more during 5:1 trials (.70) than 4:2 
trials (.62); however, post-hoc analyses revealed that this ratio difference only reached 
significance for children 10-12 years (.81 vs. .57; p < .001).  
 We next explored at what ages participants' selection of scarce and varied items 
significantly differed from chance. Given the task × age group interaction, and given that chance 
comparisons differ by ratio (see below), we tested selections against chance by ratio, task, and 
age group. Given the structure of the task as a choice between two types (A or B), with no 
variation among the individual items within each type, we calculated chance on a type-level 
basis.1 Alpha levels were set to .01 to account for multiple comparisons.   
                                                 
1 Chance could be calculated in either of two ways, depending on whether we assume that participants viewed their 
choices as between two types (A or B) or as between six individual items (e.g., A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, B1). We adopted 
the type-level analysis, as it takes into account the structure of the task (presenting a choice between two types of 
items, with no individual variation within each type). Generally, the type-level analysis provides a more 
conservative test of whether participants’ selections are above-chance, so that we can be confident in drawing 
conclusions about above-chance performance, if found. Additionally, in an unpublished study with children 4-9 
years of age (Echelbarger & Gelman, 2016), we presented a test of scarcity that controlled for chance level by 
presenting children on each trial with the same stimuli that were used in the present Study 1, but then asking 
children to identify which of two items from each set (one of each item-type) people would pay more for. This 
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 For 5:1 selections, chance was calculated as .50. Participants did not select scarce items 
significantly above chance with the exception of children 10-12 years (p < .001). Contrastingly, 
participants selected varied items significantly above chance in four of the five age groups (ps < 
.001); the one exception was children 4-5 years (p = .026). Selections during 4:2 trials were 
tested against .50 (scarcity) and .33 (variety). Participants did not select scarce items 
significantly above chance; however, varied items were selected significantly above chance in all 
age groups (all ps < .005) (see Figures 2 and 3). In the Discussion we consider how to interpret 
these distinct patterns. 
Variety in the Absence of Scarcity  
 We next tested whether the preference for variety extended to contexts where scarce 
items were not present. We conducted an ANOVA with age group (4-5, 6-7, 8-9, 10-12, Adults) 
as the between-participants factor, and no age differences were found. Participants selected 
varied items significantly above chance (.33), all ps < .001 (see Figure 3).  
Discussion 
 The results of Study 1 support our hypothesis that variety, but not scarcity, is a 
foundational preference. First, and most importantly, when the two strategies were compared 
directly to one another, variety preferences were overall elicited at a significantly higher rate 
than scarcity preferences. All ages showed this tendency, which was statistically significant 
among 6- to 7-year-olds, 8- to 9-year-olds, and adults. Furthermore, variety was generally above-
chance, whereas scarcity was rarely above-chance.  
Thus, despite the value of scarcity in many contexts, when items were wholly unfamiliar 
                                                 
method equates the type-level and individual-level calculations of chance, such that from either perspective chance 
is 50%. Analyses revealed that irrespective of ratio, children's choices hovered around 50%—consistent with the 
findings reported in the present study (comparisons to chance for all ps > .25). We conclude, therefore, that chance-
rate responding on this task was not an artifact of focusing on type-level vs. individual-level analyses. 
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and reasons for the scarcity were not provided, scarcity by itself was not a reliable cue used 
consistently by children or adults when selecting objects. The lack of a scarcity effect cannot be 
due to children not noticing the difference between the items as, in contrast, both children and 
adults preferred varied to non-varied items. This preference emerged irrespective of the relative 
availability of the two items, demonstrating that the preference for variety did not reduce to a 
scarcity selection. The early emergence of this preference demonstrates that variety is preferred 
even in the absence of knowledge about the items themselves. Ratio did emerge as a relevant 
factor, as participants selected scarce items and varied sets more when an item was maximally 
scarce (during 5:1 trials); however, ratio was not used consistently by all age groups. 
STUDY 2 
One potential limitation of Study 1 was that participants were asked to select items only 
for themselves. It is therefore possible that the lack of consistent scarcity preference was due to 
the absence of any motivation to do otherwise. In the absence of others, people may be less 
motivated to select based on scarcity, because items can conceivably be chosen at any time 
(Cialdini, 2008). In other words, the open-ended selection context may have led participants to 
downplay the importance of the relative availability of items, instead encouraging them to focus 
on items’ distinctive attributes (e.g., shape, parts, possible function). In contrast, when others are 
involved, people may be more motivated to select scarce items before others are able to do so. 
Relatedly, when others are present, people may engage in social comparison, and thus be 
motivated to compare their choices to those of another person, a process that could heighten 
attention to the relative availability of items. For both these reasons, we predicted that requiring 
participants to select items for themselves and someone else might result in increased attention to 
the relative availability of items. This process may differentially prime scarcity, such that scarce 
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items become more valuable and/or desirable. Accordingly, in Study 2, we tested whether 
selections change when participants make choices both for themselves and for another person 
such that they select scarce and varied items more for themselves to ensure that they are better 
off than the other person. 
Methods 
Participants 
 Participants included 96 children aged 4 to 12 years, subdivided into four age groups: 4-5 
years (n = 24, M = 5.03 years, SD = 0.52 years, 16 females, 8 males), 6-7 years (n = 26, M = 7.09 
years, SD = 0.63 years, 9 females, 17 males), 8-9 years (n = 24, M = 8.92 years, SD = 0.58 years, 
13 females, 11 males), and 10-12 years (n = 22, M = 11.35 years, SD = 0.94 years, 14 females, 8 
males). Based on parent report, the majority of children were White (73%). Participants also 
included 49 adults (M = 39 years, SD = 12 years, 27 females, 22 males; 94% White). An 
additional 2 children were excluded: one for being too old (experimenter error) and another for 
not understanding the task. Six adults were excluded for failing attentional control trials, and one 
for not finishing the task. Children were recruited and tested in a lab space at a local museum and 
at an after-school program in the Midwest United States. Adults were recruited through MTurk, 
using the same criteria as in Study 1. All children received a small thank-you gift for 
participating. Adults were compensated $1.00, since the task was longer than that in Study 1. 
Materials  
 The same materials from Study 1 were used, with one exception: two collection bowls 
(rather than one) were situated near children. 
Design 
 Participants selected one or two items per individual, in counterbalanced blocks. On each 
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trial, participants selected items for themselves (Self) and someone else (Other). The order in 
which items were selected (i.e., Self-first vs. Other-first) was also counterbalanced across 
participants.   
Procedure 
 For children, the procedure was the same as in Study 1 with one exception: children 
heard, “Choose one thing that you would like for yourself (someone else) and one thing that you 
would like for someone else (yourself)” and “Choose two things that you would like for yourself 
(someone else) and two things that you would like for someone else (yourself).” Children did not 
receive any information about “someone else” and did not receive any feedback on their 
selections. Adults completed an electronic survey analogous to that children received, using the 
same items, pairs, and orientations. 
Results 
The analyses examined participants' selection of scarcity and variety for themselves 
(Self) and someone else (Other). As before, scarcity and variety were assessed jointly for 5:1 and 
4:2 trials, and 3:3 trials were assessed separately. For each participant, we counted the number of 
trials that a scarce item was chosen during 5:1 and 4:2 trials when selecting one item for each 
recipient, and the number of trials that varied items were selected (one of each item type) during 
5:1, 4:2, and 3:3 trials when selecting two items for each recipient. For each ratio, there were two 
trials, and thus two opportunities to choose scarce or varied items. Scores for each trial-type 
ranged from 0 to 2. Note, however, that during 5:1 trials, it was not possible to select a scarce 
item for both recipients on the same trial. Once scores were tallied, we calculated proportions for 
each ratio in each condition (range: 0-1).  
Scarcity and Variety Compared Directly  
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We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with recipient (Self, Other), ratio (5:1, 4:2), 
and task (Scarcity, Variety) as the within-participants factors and age group (4-5, 6-7, 8-9, 10-12, 
Adults) and order (Self-first vs. Other-first) as the between-participants factors. This ANOVA 
yielded main effects of task, F(1, 135) = 130.20, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .49, ratio, F(1, 135) = 115.64, p 
< .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .46, and recipient, F(1, 135) = 15.87, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .11. These main effects are 
interpreted within the context of several interactions: task × age group, F(4, 135) = 6.19, p < 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .16, task × ratio, F(1, 135) = 37.22, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .22, ratio × age group, F(4, 135) = 
2.59, p = .040, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07, and ratio × recipient, F(1, 135) = 13.39, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .09. First, as in 
Study 1, participants selected varied sets (.62) more than scarce items (.44). A Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons was used for each post-hoc analysis, resulting in a more 
stringent alpha level of .01 (.05/5 age groups). Post-hoc analyses revealed that this difference 
reached significance for all age groups except the youngest children (4-5 years) (all other ps < 
.001). Second, as predicted, scarce items and varied sets were selected for the Self (.59) more 
than Other (.48), though this was found only during 5:1 trials (.53 vs. .33) (p < .001). Thus, when 
items are maximally scarce, children and adults prefer to select them for themselves, rather than 
for someone else. Third, varied sets and scarce items were selected more during 4:2 trials (.64) 
than 5:1 trials (.43), which was expected given that varied sets and scarce items could only be 
selected for one recipient during 5:1 trials. This result also indicates that when scarce and varied 
items are available to select for both recipients, participants did just that. We also found that 
children 6-7 years (.48) and 8-9 years (.46) selected more scarce items and varied sets than adults 
(.38) during 5:1 trials (ps < .01). Finally, the task × ratio interaction revealed that the difference 
in selections of scarce items vs. varied items was greater during 4:2 trials (.49 vs. .78) than 5:1 
trials (.39 vs. .47), again because scarce items and varied sets could only be selected for one 
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person during each 5:1 trial (see Figures 4 and 5).  
As before, we were interested in the ages at which children selected varied and/or scarce 
items significantly above chance for themselves and someone else. In order to conduct 
comparisons to chance, we focused on the first trial per item set (either self or other), as it is the 
only on the first trial that chance levels are equivalent across items and conditions. That is, in 
order to test whether selections of scarce items were significantly above chance, we separately 
tested selections to the self first and someone else first. As in Study 1, we tested selections 
against chance by ratio, type, age group, and recipient. Comparisons to chance were based on 
types not individuals (see Footnote 1). Thus, scarcity selections were tested against .50 and 
variety selections were tested against .50 (5:1) and .33 (4:2). Alpha levels were set to .01 to 
account for multiple comparisons.   
Consistent with results from Study 1, children and adults selected scarce items at chance 
with only one exception: when selecting items for someone else during 5:1 trials, adults selected 
scarce items significantly below chance (p = .009). Turning to variety selections, children and 
adults selected varied items at chance during 5:1 trials (when only one recipient can obtain 
variety) with only two exceptions: when selecting for themselves, children 6-7 years selected 
varied items significantly above chance (p = .006), and when selecting for someone else, adults 
selected varied items significantly below chance (p < .001). Finally, when selecting on 4:2 trials, 
children 6-12 years and adults selected varied items for themselves and someone else 
significantly above chance (all ps < .02); however, children 4-5 years did not. 
Variety in the Absence of Scarcity 
In order to assess variety preference in the absence of scarcity, we conducted a repeated 
measures ANOVA with recipient (Self, Other) as the within-participants factor and age group (4-
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5, 6-7, 8-9, 10-12, Adults) and order (Self-first vs. Other-first) as the between-participants 
factors. This ANOVA yielded a main effect of age group, F(4. 135) = 9.07, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .21, 
and two interactions: recipient × order, F(1, 135) = 10.84, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07, and recipient × age 
group × order, F(4, 135) = 3.03, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08. The results are interpreted within the context 
of the three-way interaction, and post-hoc analyses (Bonferroni-corrected using an adjusted alpha 
level of .01) revealed that when selecting items for someone else first, the children 6-7 years 
selected more scarce items and varied sets for themselves than they did for someone else (p = 
.005) (see Figure 5). When testing against chance (.33), we found that children 6-12 years and 
adults selected varied items significantly above chance (ps < .01) with one exception: children 6-
7 years did not select varied sets for someone else significantly above chance (p = .014). As 
before, children 4-5 years did not select varied items significantly above chance.  
Discussion 
 Results from Study 2 suggest that social comparison did increase the desirability of 
maximally scarce items, but that scarcity per se was still at best only weakly preferred. 
Moreover, adults were actually averse to selecting scarce items for someone else, doing so 
significantly below chance. Nonetheless, even under these comparative conditions, the scarce 
item was never selected for the self above chance. During 4:2 trials, when there were two scarce 
items and thus participants were able to select scarce items for both themselves and someone 
else, we obtained no self-other differences, with selection of the scarce item at chance levels for 
both children and adults (with the few noted exceptions). In summary, scarcity did become more 
salient under conditions of social comparison, when participants were forced to select only one 
person to receive the scarce item (5:1 trials). 
Contrastingly, both adults and children consistently selected variety more for themselves 
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than for someone else when one of the items was maximally scarce (during 5:1 trials). However, 
when able to select variety for both themselves and someone else (during 4:2 and 3:3 trials), 
children 6-12 years and adults tended to do just that, at similarly high levels. Further, when 
comparing selections against chance, we found that children 6-12 years and adults consistently 
selected varied items for themselves above chance, and consistently selected varied items for 
others when items were not maximally scarce (4:2 and 3:3 trials). Children 4-5 years did not 
consistently select varied items significantly above chance, even when able to do so for both 
recipients, perhaps reflecting the greater information-processing demands of a task that required 
children to make four selections per trial.   
STUDY 3      
 In Study 1, participants selected items for only themselves, and in Study 2, participants 
selected items for themselves and someone else. As reported above, the context of Study 2 led to 
relatively higher selections of scarcity and variety for self than for other. However, in order to 
determine whether it was social comparison (self vs. other) that yielded higher rates of selection, 
it is also important to conduct a baseline study to determine the rates at which scarce and varied 
items are assigned to the self or other (i.e., in the absence of social comparison). Specifically, 
such a comparison is needed to determine whether social comparison per se yielded such effects, 
or if instead the effects reflect differences in making choices for these different recipients. This 
was the purpose of Study 3, in which participants were asked to select items for someone other 
than themselves only. If the self-other differences in Study 2 were the result of social comparison 
increasing attention to scarcity and variety, then the self-other differences in Study 2 should not 
be replicated when comparing responses to the self (from Study 1) to responses to other (from 
Study 3). In contrast, if it simply is the case that participants avoid allocating scarce and varied 
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items to someone other than themselves, then a comparison of Study 1 results to Study 3 results 
should reveal significant self-other differences even in the absence of direct social comparison. 
Methods 
Participants 
 Participants included 96 children aged 4 to 12 years, subdivided into four age groups: 4-5 
years (n = 25, M = 4.97 years, SD = 0.52 years, 10 females, 15 males), 6-7 years (n = 25, M = 
6.85 years, SD = 0.49 years, 14 females, 11 males), 8-9 years (n = 24, M = 8.99 years, SD = 0.63 
years, 12 females, 12 males), and 10-12 years (n = 22, M = 11.09 years, SD = 0.74 years, 12 
females, 10 males). Participants also included 51 adults (M = 40 years, SD = 12 years, 31 
females, 20 males). An additional 21 children were excluded: 7 due to experimenter error, 10 due 
to a gender imbalance, and 4 for other reasons including: attentional issues, observing other 
children complete the task, and parental interference. Eight adults were excluded: 2 due to 
experimenter error, 2 for failing attentional control trials, and 4 for not finishing the task. 
Children were recruited and tested in a lab space at a local museum and at an after-school 
program in the Midwest. Adults were recruited through MTurk, using the same criteria as Study 
1. All children received a small thank-you gift for participating. Adults were compensated $0.50, 
a competitive rate. 
Materials  
 The same materials from Study 1 were used. 
Design 
 The design followed that from Study 1 with one exception: participants selected one or 
two items for someone else (Other), and not for the self.  
Procedure 
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 For children, the procedure was the same as in Study 1 with one exception: children 
heard, “Choose one thing that you would like for someone else” or “Choose two things that you 
would like for someone else.” As in Study 2, children did not receive any information about 
“someone else” and did not receive any feedback on their selections. Adults completed an 
electronic survey analogous to that children received, using the same items, pairs, and 
orientations. 
Results 
The analyses examined participants’ selections for someone else based on scarcity and 
variety, with a primary focus on how performance in Study 3 compared to that of Study 1. 
Scarcity and variety were assessed jointly for 5:1 and 4:2 trials. However, 3:3 trials were 
assessed separately as before. For each participant, we counted the number of trials that a scarce 
item was chosen during 5:1 and 4:2 trials when selecting one item, and the number of trials that 
varied items were selected (one of each item type) during 5:1, 4:2, and 3:3 trials when selecting 
two items. For each ratio, there were two trials, and thus two opportunities to choose scarce or 
varied items. Scores for each trial-type ranged from 0 to 2. Once scores were tallied, we 
calculated proportions for each ratio in each condition (range: 0-1).  
Scarcity and Variety Compared Directly 
We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with ratio (5:1, 4:2) and type (Scarcity, 
Variety) as the within-participants factors, and age group (4-5, 6-7, 8-9, 10-12, Adults) as the 
between-participants factor. This analysis yielded a main effect of task, F(1, 142) = 138.00, p < 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .49. Participants selected varied items (.82) more than scarce items (.48). No other 
significant factors emerged.  
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We next explored at what ages children selected varied and/or scarce items significantly 
above chance. As before, we tested selections against chance by ratio, type, and age group. Also 
as before, scarcity selections were tested against .50 and variety selections were tested against 
.50 (5:1) and .33 (4:2), and our alpha level was set to .01. Participants did not select scarce items 
significantly above chance; however, varied items were selected above chance for each ratio and 
age group (all ps ≤ .001) (see Figures 2 and 3). 
Variety in the Absence of Scarcity 
As before, we conducted an ANOVA with age group (4-5, 6-7, 8-9, 10-12, Adults) as the 
between-participants factor. There was no effect of age and varied sets were selected above 
chance within each age group (.33; all ps < .001; see Figure 3). 
Study 1 vs. Study 3 
 Finally, we tested whether there was any effect of recipient across the two studies. That 
is, we tested whether the proportion of scarce and varied items selected for the self (Study 1) or 
other (Study 3) differed for any ratio. To do so, we assessed 5:1 and 4:2 trials jointly, and 
assessed 3:3 trials separately as above with age group (4-5, 6-7, 8-9, 10-12, Adults) and study 
(Self vs. Other) as the between-participants factors. These analyses yielded no significant effects 
or interactions involving study.   
Discussion 
 The purpose of Study 3 was to examine participants’ use of scarcity and variety when 
selecting items for someone else, and to compare those selections to those made for the self in 
Study 1. Results indicated no effect of study, for either scarcity or variety. That is, in the absence 
of social comparison, children and adults selected scarce and varied items for themselves and 
someone else at comparable levels. This contrasts with the self-other differences obtained in 
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Study 2. In Study 2, when self and other were in conflict for either the scarce item or a varied set 
of items, selections of scarcity and variety were higher for self than other when items were 
maximally scarce. Thus, the results of Study 3 indicate that self-other differences observed in 
Study 2 were due to social comparison, which increases attention to scarcity and variety.  
General Discussion 
The purpose of this research was to determine whether and when children and adults 
prefer variety and scarcity. By asking participants to select from arrays of novel items, and 
providing no information about the items other than their relative availability, we were able to 
test whether they have a direct preference for varied and scarce items, above and beyond features 
of the objects themselves. We predicted that children and adults would prefer varied sets of 
items, given the benefits associated with obtaining variety (i.e., hedging against uncertainty and 
managing satiation). In contrast, we predicted that children and adults would less often use 
scarcity, as scarcity itself does not necessarily signal higher value (e.g., a scarce item can be 
scarce due to popularity or low demand). Both of our predictions were largely supported. 
Overall, the results indicated a robust and consistent preference for variety across different ratios 
and different selection contexts in children and adults. In contrast, we found little support for a 
direct scarcity preference at any age. To our knowledge, these data are the first to demonstrate 
that children make use of variety to guide their selections of items, and that scarcity is relatively 
less often used. Importantly, this result does not reflect an inability on the part of young children 
to differentially select items of greater perceived value to the self. Children's distribution of items 
reflects the value they place on such items (e.g., Blake & Rand, 2010). Rather, the result 
indicates that scarcity per se does not have intrinsic value, at least in the contexts studied here. 
Additionally, we also obtained evidence regarding the influence of multiple recipients in 
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the preference for scarcity and variety. When participants were required to select items for 
themselves and someone else (Study 2), self-other differences did emerge for both scarcity and 
variety when items were maximally scarce (the 5:1 ratio). Specifically, participants selected 
scarce items for themselves more than they did for someone else. This was the only condition in 
which scarcity emerged as a preference. However, given that adults who selected for themselves 
first did not select scarce items above chance, but those who selected for someone else first 
selected scarce items for that other person significantly below chance, it may be that there is a 
stronger aversion to giving away scarce items than there is a preference for choosing scarce 
items. Such a result is consistent with motivations to ensure that others do not obtain more than 
we do, even if it comes at a cost to us. Nonetheless, the influence of uniquely scarce items 
requires further attention, as based on our analyses, they are treated differently than non-uniquely 
scarce items (e.g., scarce items during 4:2 trials).  
Turning to the effect of multiple recipients on variety, we found that both adults and 
children selected varied items for themselves more than they did for someone else when only one 
recipient could obtain variety (the 5:1 ratio). In contrast, when not in the context of multiple 
recipients—that is, when participants were asked to select items for a single recipient (Studies 1 
and 3)—we found no differences in selections made to the self or someone else, for either 
scarcity or variety. The inclusion of another recipient also appears to increase attention to 
scarcity, resulting in increased selections of scarce items for the self (“profit maximizing”) or 
decreased selections of scarce items for another (“profit minimizing”). We speculate that this 
effect may be stronger in the context of different kinds of goods, given that 6- to 8-year-old 
children prioritize different features when distributing luxuries vs. necessities to others (Rizzo, 
Elenbaas, Cooley, & Killen, 2016). For example, children may be more inclined to give away a 
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scarce necessity to someone in need, as compared to giving away a scarce luxury that is not 
needed.  
These data indicate that scarcity is not a simple context-free cue to object value; on this 
task, scarcity without context has little value to either children or adults. Interpreting the results 
in this way supports the notion that a preference for scarce items may typically result from one or 
more derived mechanisms (e.g., uniqueness, popularity, authenticity). For example, Sharma and 
Alter (2014) showed that adults who viewed themselves as less financially well off sought scarce 
items more than adults who viewed themselves as more financially well off, particularly when 
the items were less available to others. Similarly, in a meta-analysis conducted by Lynn (1991), a 
greater psychological need for uniqueness was associated with greater valuations of scarce items. 
Finally, adults are sensitive to the reasons why an item was scarce. For example, Verhallen and 
Robben (1994) found that an item that was scarce because it was popular was preferred to an 
item that was scarce due to accidental loss. As another example, Gierl and Huettl (2010) found 
that the value of scarce items was an interaction of the reasons for the scarcity—low supply vs. 
high demand—and whether or not the product was used for conspicuous consumption. Thus, 
future work should manipulate the reasons that items are scarce to determine if children are 
similarly sensitive to these reasons and whether they influence children’s valuations of scarce 
and non-scarce items.  
One could argue that perhaps we did not observe a scarcity preference because items 
within pairs were the same color. Recall that this design decision was based on a wish to 
minimize children’s selections based on a preference for a particular color. Nonetheless, we 
conducted a supplementary experiment with 49 adults (M = 34 years) to determine if they would 
be more sensitive to scarcity when items differed by color rather than shape. Using the same 
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design as the Self condition of Study 1 and a subset of the novel items, we found that adults, 
again, did not prefer scarce items for themselves during either 5:1 (M = .56) or 4:2 trials (M = 
.48).     
One could also argue that we did not observe a scarcity preference because the sparse 
nature of the task was too far removed from the realities of actual selection contexts (though note 
that children encounter similar sorts of object displays when selecting a prize at a carnival, 
dentist office, or developmental psychology laboratory). Recall that the purpose of the research 
was to assess whether varied and scarce items were selected for the simple sake of obtaining 
varied and scarce items. It would have been difficult to assess whether these cues were used 
independent of other factors had we provided participants with more information concerning the 
items (e.g., function, value) or their relative distributions (e.g., one was more popular than the 
other). In spite of this, we still observed a strong effect of variety, which is consistent with our 
prediction that a variety preference is early emerging and people are directly motivated to obtain 
it. The relative lack of a scarcity preference suggests that scarcity itself is not used consistently 
with minimal context; however, this does not preclude scarcity being consistently used in other 
contexts. 
The present findings do not suggest that children fail to use scarcity to make decisions or 
economic judgments; indeed, prior evidence demonstrates otherwise. Rather, our findings 
suggest that they rarely use it as a preference in and of itself. For example, in a study conducted 
by Hay and colleagues, 2-year-olds were sensitive to the relative availability of toys, as 
evidenced by their increase in sharing when duplicate toys were available (Hay, Caplan, Castle, 
& Stimson, 1991). Kenward and Dahl (2011) also found that at 4.5 years, children prefer to 
distribute more items to a helping puppet rather than a hindering puppet when items were not 
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plentiful. We also know that children attend to the quality of items when making decisions 
concerning how to distribute them. For example, Blake and Rand (2010) showed that by 3 to 6 
years, children allocate stickers of higher value differently than stickers of lower value, and 
Shaw and Olson (2013) showed that children 6 to 8 years consider item value when rectifying 
inequalities. In a more recent study, Chernyak and Sobel (2016) demonstrated that preschoolers 
allocate stickers differently depending on which puppet they prefer—specifically, they allocated 
rare stickers to preferred puppets. However, allocations of scarcity were confounded with 
variety, as children tended to allocate equally to each puppet (resulting in varied stickers for the 
preferred puppet). Finally, Sheskin and colleagues (2016) found that children through 10 years of 
age prefer to allocate items by quantity but not quality (i.e., they allocate more preferred items to 
themselves) when in competition for them. However, they also found that when not in 
competition for items, children between 6-8 years allocate based on quantity and quality, 
demonstrating that a preference for the self can supersede a preference for quality equality. 
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that children are sensitive to the relative availability 
and quality of an item, and thus, if scarcity were valued in and of itself, this should have emerged 
within our age range. 
In contrast to the relative lack of a scarcity bias, we found that a preference for variety 
emerges early in childhood, as evidenced by the selection of varied items above chance by 
children as young as 4-5 years. Importantly, this preference held up for the most part across the 
different ratios, different age groups, when selecting for different recipients (Self or Other), 
when selecting for multiple recipients (Self vs. Other), and when selecting novel items. This 
early-emerging preference may reflect the evolutionary benefits of obtaining varied sets (e.g., “I 
don’t know what I’ll need tomorrow, so I’ll take one of each item today”), mentioned previously.  
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These interesting findings more generally require further exploration. It is still unclear what 
comprises a variety set for children. It might be that any perceptible difference yields a variety 
preference, or perhaps a functional difference is required. It is also unclear what value, 
psychological or monetary, children place on variety itself.   
Conclusions 
The present research contributes to our understanding of factors influencing the valuation 
of items that children encounter. When given minimal information about items, children and 
adults prefer variety to guide their choices, yet scarcity has little (if any) value. Thus, a robust, 
general, and early-emerging preference for variety contrasts with a relative lack of preference for 
scarcity per se, even among adults. These findings point to several opportunities for future 
research. Does the preference for variety translate into higher monetary valuations, above and 
beyond the value of the individual items themselves? What contextual and/or causal factors 
move children and adults to place higher value on scarcity? How do judgments based on one’s 
own preferences influence the sorts of resource distributions children and adults may be called 
upon to make? These are exciting questions for further inquiry. 
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Figure 1. Sample novel item pairs (Studies 1-3). Sample novel item pairs presented to 
participants during 5:1, 4:2, and 3:3 trials. Reprinted from Echelbarger and Gelman (2017). 
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Figure 2. Scarce items selected for Self (Study 1) and Other (Study 3). Proportion of scarce 
items selected during 5:1 trials (top) and 4:2 trials (bottom) by age group. Reprinted from 
Echelbarger and Gelman (2017). 
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Figure 3. Varied sets selected for Self (Study1) and Other (Study 3). Proportion of varied sets 
selected during 5:1 trials (top), 4:2 trials (middle), and 3:3 trials (bottom) by age group. 
Reprinted from Echelbarger and Gelman (2017). 
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Figure 4. Scarce items selected for Self + Other (Study 2). Proportion of scarce items selected 
during 5:1 trials (top) and 4:2 trials (bottom) for each recipient by age group. Reprinted from 
Echelbarger and Gelman (2017). 
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Figure 5. Varied sets selected for Self + Other (Study 2). Proportion of varied sets selected 
during 5:1 trials (top), 4:2 trials (middle), and 3:3 trials (bottom) for each recipient by age group. 
Reprinted from Echelbarger and Gelman (2017). 
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Chapter 3: Children’s Use of Variety to Guide Decision Making 
 
Don’t put all your eggs in one basket. (folk idiom) 
 Variety seeking is a well-studied phenomenon in adults (see Kahn, 1995 for review). 
Work exploring this phenomenon has shown that adults will forego preferred experiences to 
achieve variety (Ratner et al., 1999), and that the desire to satiate some goal (e.g., quench thirst) 
is also associated with increased variety seeking (Goukens, Dewitte, Pandelaere, & Warlop, 
2007). Two related explanatory accounts have been proposed to motivate this preference for 
variety: utility maximization and hedging (Kahn, 1995; McAlister, 1982).  
Given motivations to maximize utility (e.g., happiness, benefit), a person may seek out 
variety to guard against diminishing utility that an additional unit of some item (or experience) 
may offer. For example, when deciding what to buy, you may opt to purchase two different types 
of blouses rather than two of the same blouse. Doing so may increase satisfaction in your 
purchase as you can guard against boredom that may arise due to repeatedly wearing the same 
blouse. As a result, you may feel happier about both your purchases and the resulting outfits 
incorporating those blouses. Also, because the future is inherently unknown, a person may be 
motivated to hedge against this uncertain future and diversify their selections. For example, 
when traveling, you may decide to pack for a range of possible activities (e.g., dinners requiring 
business-casual attire, outdoor activities requiring athletic wear) rather than one single type of 
activity. By doing so, you have increased the likelihood that you are better prepared for future 
unknown needs that may arise. Though conceptually distinct, utility maximization and hedging 
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are not incompatible—both can operate simultaneously to influence selections. Under either 
account, people not only should select variety over non-variety, but also should place greater 
monetary value on variety. 
 Recall that in Chapter 2, children as young as 4-5 years preferred varied sets (one each of 
two different items) to non-varied sets (two of the same time), which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that variety seeking is a foundational preference present early in life. In fact, children, 
who within this age range tend to show an aversion to inequality (e.g., Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; 
Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; Shaw, Choshen-Hillel, & Caruso, 2016; Shaw & Olson, 
2012), selected varied sets for themselves even when it was not possible to select a varied set for 
someone else. Children’s selection of varied sets for themselves in a context where they would 
otherwise seek to distribute equally demonstrates that children are willing to depart from equality 
when obtaining variety is at stake. Thus, this early, robust preference for variety requires further 
exploration as we need to better understand the mechanisms underlying children’s selections. By 
doing so, we can also better understand the developmental origins of adults' motivation to seek 
out variety. 
Present Research 
 The purpose of the research in Chapter 3 is to explore the nature of children’s 
motivations to seek out variety, by asking for monetary valuations of varied and non-varied sets. 
Results from Chapter 2 suggest that children as young as 4-5 engage in direct variety-seeking 
behavior (i.e., that variety is a preference elicited on the basis of encountering varied item sets, 
and does not require additional information or rationale; McAlister & Pessemier, 1982). 
However, an alternative explanation for the selection of variety in Studies 1-3 may be that it 
reflected a decision-making strategy directed at dealing with indecision. Recall that in Studies 1-
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3, the two item types in each set (A and B) were novel and comparable to one another, for which 
children may have had no particular a priori preference. If participants felt that their choice was a 
difficult one—that is, if there was no preference for A or B, due to the similarity and/or 
unfamiliarity of these items—then they may have adopted the strategy of “splitting the 
difference” by selecting one of each type. In this case, variety is not being sought for the sake of 
obtaining it; rather, it results from a strategy to avoid a difficult decision. Thus, additional 
evidence is needed to understand the underlying mechanism(s) giving rise to children’s (and 
adults’) selections of variety, and in particular to determine if this is a direct motivation (i.e., to 
obtain variety for the sake of doing so).  
To discern underlying mechanisms, I tested whether children (and adults as a comparison 
group) assign monetary value to varied sets (Studies 4 and 5). Study 4 compares the value of 
varied sets to non-varied sets (e.g., AB vs. AA or BB), whereas Study 5 compares the value of 
varied sets to the individuals that comprise those sets (e.g., AB vs. A or B). If participants at a 
given age are directly motivated to select variety, then they should place higher monetary 
valuations on varied sets vs. non-varied sets—consistent with both maximizing utility and 
hedging. Furthermore, if participants are hedging, then they should place higher monetary 
valuations on varied sets than the sum of the components of those sets. However, if a variety 
preference, as observed in Studies 1-3, reflects indecision, then varied sets should receive no 
higher monetary valuations than non-varied sets in either study design. Following Studies 4-5, I 
test the implications of a variety preference for choices involving less-preferred items (Studies 6 
and 7). Specifically, Studies 6 and 7 test whether participants will forego a preferred item in 
order to obtain variety. Together, Studies 4-7 provide insights into the robustness of variety-
seeking, including the mechanisms underlying variety preferences. These studies more clearly 
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test a variety preference in ways (via valuations and selections) that Studies 1-3 could not.  
STUDY 4 
In Study 4, I test whether children (and adults) place higher monetary valuations on 
varied vs. non-varied sets. In general, there are three possible outcomes—variety could be valued 
more than non-variety, on par with non-variety, or less than non-variety (this last outcome is 
included for completeness and is not predicted). If participants are directly motivated to select 
variety, then variety should yield a monetary boost. This monetary boost could be due to utility 
maximization, whereby subsequent units of similar items are devalued, or due to hedging, 
whereby variety receives an absolute boost. However, if parents are simply avoiding making a 
difficult decision, variety should yield no monetary boost and be valued on par with non-variety.  
 Here I walk through more concrete examples involving the different possible outcomes: 
(a) Despite a preference for variety, there may be no monetary effect, such that the value of a 
varied set is equivalent to the value of the sum of the component elements (e.g., two balls = $10; 
two Frisbees = $14; one ball + one Frisbee = $12). (b) Given a preference for variety, varied sets 
may be given a higher value, either relative (two balls = $10; two Frisbees = $14; one ball + one 
Frisbee = $13, which is higher than the average of the value of the two non-varied sets) or 
absolute (e.g., two balls = $10; two Frisbees = $14; one ball + one Frisbee = $15, which higher 
than the value of either of the two non-varied sets). (c) Despite a preference for variety, there 
may be a monetary cost to it (e.g., two balls = $10; two Frisbees = $14; one ball + one Frisbee = 
$11). (Note that this third possibility is not expected, given the previously demonstrated variety 
preference, but it is included for the sake of completeness). 
Items from Studies 1-3 are used to allow for the clearest interpretation of those studies in 
light of Study 4 results. However, unlike Studies 1-3, children are 6-9 years rather than 4-12 
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years. Early testing revealed that children 4-5 years had difficulty passing the pretest assessing 
whether they could provide accurate valuations (described below). Children 10-12 years were 
included for exploratory purposes in Studies 1-3 and are not included here. Should children (and 
adults) place higher valuations on varied vs. non-varied sets, then I have clearer evidence that 
children directly prefer variety rather than use variety as a means to avoid a difficult decision.  
Methods 
Participants 
 Participants included 80 children subdivided into two age groups: 6-7 years (n = 44, M = 
7.06 years, SD = .61 years, 22 females, 22 males) and 8-9 years (n = 36, M = 8.83 years, SD = 
.49 years, 17 females, 18 males, 1 unreported), and 28 adults (M = 19.47 years, SD = 1.18 years, 
16 females, 12 males). An additional child was excluded for not finishing the task. Parents 
identified their children as White (71%), Asian (10%), Multiracial (9%), and other (5%); the 
remaining parents did not identify their children’s race. Adults identified themselves as White 
(71%), Black (11%), or Asian (18%). Children were recruited from laboratory spaces in 
museums in a university city in the midwestern United States; adults were recruited from a 
university Psychology subject pool in the same city. Children were compensated with a small 
thank-you gift; adults received course credit.  
Materials 
 Materials included photographs of 24 novel items (e.g., tools, toys) from the Novel 
Objects and Unusual Names Database (Horst & Hout, 2016). Items were divided into 12 pairs, 
and items within pairs were edited to be the same color. Six colors were used for the 12 pairs: 
red, orange, yellow, green, blue, purple. In addition, four photographs of cookies (two whole and 
two with bites taken out of them), four photographs of shoes (two clean shoes and two shoes 
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covered in paint), one photograph of a backpack, and one photograph of a television were 
included. 
Design  
Each experimental trial included twelve tokens of two novel items presented in a 3 x 4 
array. Within each trial, participants saw two items in one of two ratios: 6:6 (Equal) and 10:2 
(Scarcity). Children were assigned to either the Equal (n = 36) or Scarcity (n = 44) condition; 
adults completed both. The Equal condition served as a test of the value of variety when it is not 
in competition with other factors (such as relative frequency). In contrast, the Scarcity condition 
provides a stronger test of the value of variety, as for some sets variety was placed in competition 
with scarcity. The location of items during Equal trials was counterbalanced within and across 
participants (top vs. bottom). Scarce items appeared in one of two locations—upper left, lower 
right—to make it easier for participants to detect them. The presentation of the trials themselves 
was randomized using Qualtrics. Because participants were required to provide valuations of sets 
given the total population of items, the location of the sets was counterbalanced across trials 
(AA, BB, AB). For each ratio, the varied set appeared in each location (left, center, right) two 
times. Finally, the location of each item within the varied set (top, bottom) was also 
counterbalanced across participants. See Figure 6 for sample Equal and Scarcity trials.  
Procedure 
 Children. Children first received parental consent and provided assent, then met with an 
experimenter individually. Children first completed the pretest designed to test whether they 
could provide accurate valuations (see Gelman et al., 2015, for a similar method). In this pretest, 
children first identified which of two kinds of items people would pay more for (cookie vs. 
cookie with bite taken out; clean shoe vs. shoe with paint on it). After indicating which items 
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people would pay more for, children were then asked how much people would pay for each item. 
Children received feedback on their selections of items people would pay more for (e.g., if a 
child indicated that people would pay more for the cookie with a bite taken out of it, they were 
told that actually people would pay more for the other cookie because it is whole); children 
received no feedback on their actual valuations. To be included in the study, children must have 
correctly placed a higher value on the whole cookie and the clean shoe. 
 After completing the pretest, children then completed either the Equal (6 trials) or 
Scarcity (6 trials) condition. At the outset of the experimental task, children were oriented to a 
backpack and a television and their associated values provided by someone else earlier that day 
(i.e., “Earlier today, I asked someone how much people would pay for this backpack and this 
TV. They said that people would pay $50 for this backpack and $957 for this TV. Now I’m 
going to ask you some questions.”). This warm-up was included to introduce children to the 
format of the task. Due to collecting data in museum spaces where constraints are placed on task 
length, children completed only one condition whereas adults completed both. Children were 
instructed to look at the computer and point to each item. This ensured that children attended to 
each item in the array. They were then directed to look at three sets of items and asked how 
much people would pay for each set. Children provided valuations from left to right. Participants 
were required to provide whole dollar amounts, to decrease task demands on children. However, 
in instances where children provided partial dollar amounts (e.g., $4.50), they were instructed to 
indicate how many dollars people would pay for the set.  
 Adults. After providing consent, adults completed both conditions. Adult did not receive 
the pretest.  
Results 
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For each participant, I calculated the mean value offered for each of the test pairs (AA, 
BB, AB), and then log (base 10) transformed the values. When novel items were equally 
represented (6:6), the values of the same-item pairs (e.g., AA, BB) were averaged and log 
transformed. When one novel item was scarce (10:2), the values of the same-item pairs were 
calculated separately (e.g., Same-Scarce, Same-Non-scarce). Varied set calculations were the 
same across both conditions. In an additional analysis, I collapsed across values provided for 
same-item pairs in the Scarcity condition, following the calculation procedure used for same-
item pairs in the Equal condition. 
I first tested whether there were effects of age and pair-type on participants’ valuations 
when the two novel items were represented equally (6:6). A repeated measures ANOVA with 
pair-type (Variety, Same) as the within-participants factor and age group (6-7, 8-9, Adults) as the 
between-participants factor yielded only a main effect of pair-type, F(1, 61) = 13.90, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .19. Participants placed a higher value on varied sets compared to same-item sets (.99 vs. .93, 
which equates to $9.77 vs. $8.51; see Figure 7). No other significant results were obtained.  
I next tested whether this finding extended to valuations in the Scarcity condition, by 
collapsing across same-item sets (same scarce, same non-scarce). A repeated measures ANOVA 
with pair-type (Variety, Same) as the within-participants factor and age group (6-7, 8-9, Adults) 
as the between-participants factor yielded a main effect of pair-type, F(1, 69) = 5.71, p = .020, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .08. Participants placed a higher value on varied sets compared to same-item sets (Ms = 1.00 
vs. .96, which equates to $10.00 vs. $9.12). No other significant results were obtained.  
Lastly, I tested whether the result observed above held across all sets when broken out by 
pair type in the Scarcity condition. A repeated measures ANOVA with pair-type (Variety, Same-
Scarce, Same-Non-scarce) as the within-participants factor and age group (6-7, 8-9, Adults) as 
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the between-participants factor yielded a main effect of pair-type, F(2, 138) = 6.36, p = .002, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .08, and a pair-type × age group interaction, F(4, 138) = 2.86, p = .026, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08. To account 
for multiple comparisons, the alpha level was set to .017 (.05/3 age groups). Although 
participants overall placed a higher value on varied sets (1.00) compared to same-non-scarce 
(.91) sets (p = .002), this result was not observed in all age groups. Children 6-7 years valued 
variety (1.07) more than same-scarce (.96) sets (p = .014), whereas adults valued variety (1.07) 
and same-scarce (1.10) more than same-non-scarce (.94) sets (ps ≤ .006). Children 8-9 years 
valued all sets similarly (see Figure 7).   
 Individual response patterns. I next tested whether response patterns differed as a 
function of condition and age to determine whether variety was valued more than non-variety 
consistently within and across groups. Specifically, each participant was classified as showing 
one of three patterns, for scores collapsed across trials: Variety > Same, Variety = Same, or 
Variety < Same. When items were equally represented (6:6), 11 children 6-7 years valued varied 
more than same-item sets (7 showed the reverse pattern, and 1 valued the types of sets equally); 
13 of children 8-9 years valued varied more than same-item sets (2 showed the reverse pattern, 
and 2 valued the types of sets equally); 12 of 28 adults valued varied more than same-item sets (3 
showed the reverse pattern, and 13 valued the types of sets equally). These frequencies were 
significantly different from the expected distribution, χ2(4, N = 64) = 18.16, p = .003. Adjusting 
the alpha to .006 to account for multiple comparisons (.05/9 tests) reveals that more adults than 
expected valued the sets equally (p < .001). No other differences reached significance.  
Turning to trials where one item was scarce (10:2), 16 children 6-7 years valued varied 
more than same-item sets (5 showed the reverse pattern, and 4 valued the types of sets equally); 
11 children 8-9 years valued varied more than same-item sets (8 showed the reverse pattern, and 
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0 valued the types of sets equally); 10 of 28 adults valued varied more than same-item sets (3 
showed the reverse pattern, and 15 valued the types of sets equally). These frequencies, too, were 
significantly different from the expected distribution, χ2(4, N = 72) = 21.25, p < .001. Adjusting 
the alpha to .006 to, again, account for multiple comparisons reveals that fewer children 8-9 
years and more adults than expected valued the types of sets equally (p ≤ .002). No other 
differences reached significance.  
Discussion 
 Overall, children and adults placed higher valuations on varied compared to non-varied 
sets, and did so at similar levels. Importantly, this result suggests that variety selections in 
Studies 1-3 were not simply due to avoiding making a difficult decision. However, when one of 
two items was relatively scarce, I observed a developmental shift in the evaluation of the scarce 
item: children placed higher valuations on sets including non-scarce items, whereas adults placed 
higher valuations on sets including scarce items. Such a result may reflect adults’ better 
understanding of the influence of market forces (e.g., supply) on price, which children have 
difficulty with (e.g., Leiser & Halachmi, 2006; Siegler & Thompson, 1998; Thompson & 
Siegler, 2000). Though results were consistent across conditions, it should be noted that the 
overall effect was small. The added value associated with variety was consistent but slight and 
roughly translates to $1.12 (after calculating difference in log values of same-item and varied 
sets across conditions). 
 The higher value placed on variety in the Equal condition across age groups provides the 
clearest evidence that varied sets confer a higher value than non-varied sets (though note that 
adults were more inclined to value the sets equally compared to children). At the same time, the 
data from the Scarcity sets shows that variety is not valued uniquely above other factors, since 
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relative availability also plays a role: varied sets are valued equivalently to sets with two 
abundant items (for children) or to sets with two scarce items (for adults). The developmental 
shift towards valuing scarce-item sets more than non-scarce items sets requires further 
exploration; however, it does show that, in children and adults, added value associated with 
variety is influenced by relative availability. Finally, it is important to note that although the task 
required participants to provide whole dollar amounts, and thus was not sensitive to small 
differences in value (e.g., the difference between $10 and $11 is 10%; however, the added value 
assigned to variety may be 2%), we nonetheless obtained differences as a function of variety. 
Such sensitivity might be greater if participants were permitted to provide smaller monetary 
units. 
STUDY 5 
 Though the results of Study 4 demonstrate that children and adults place higher monetary 
valuations on variety, they leave open the mechanism. Specifically, the added value may be 
associated with diminished value assigned to additional units of the same items (consistent with 
maximizing utility) or may be due to added value assigned to different set types (consistent with 
hedging). For example, if a participant valued two of one item (AA) at $10, two of a second item 
(BB) at $14, and a varied set (AB) at $13, this could be because variety per se has increased 
value, but alternatively it could be because the same-set pairs include unequal values (e.g., the 
first A is valued at $6 and the second is valued at $4). Disentangling the value of an individual 
item from the value of the pair is needed to reveal the mechanism underlying the preference for 
variety itself. Thus, the purpose of Study 5 is to determine whether participants place a premium 
on variety itself. If this is the case, then if Item A is valued at $5 and Item B is valued at $6, then 
the set Item A + Item B would be assigned a value greater than $11. If this result is not obtained, 
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then the value associated with variety may be due to other processes, such as diminished value 
assigned to the second item in same-set pairs. Thus, Study 5 tests whether children and adults 
assign a premium to variety sets above and beyond the value of the individual items comprising 
the variety set.  
Methods 
Participants 
Participants included 66 children subdivided into two age groups: 6-7 years (n = 32, M = 
6.77 years, SD = .49 years, 17 females, 15 males) and 8-9 years (n = 34, M = 8.93 years, SD = 
.58 years, 20 females, 14 males), and 34 adults (M = 19.25 years, SD = .83 years, 19 females, 15 
males). An additional six children were excluded for the following reasons: two for not passing 
the pretest, two for not completing the study, one due to attentional issues, and one due to 
experimenter error. Parents identified their children as White (80%), Black (2%), Asian (6%), 
Multiracial (5%), and other (2%); the remaining parents did not identify their children’s race. 
Adults identified themselves as White (68%), Black (9%), Asian (15%), Multiracial (6%), and 
other (3%). Children were recruited from a laboratory space in a university city in the 
midwestern United States; adults were recruited from a university Psychology subject pool in the 
same city. Children were compensated with a small thank-you gift; adults received course credit.  
Materials 
 Materials included the same novel item pairs as used in Study 4. Children completed the 
same pretest, including the same items. 
Design  
Each experimental trial included three choices: Item A, Item B, and Item A + Item B. 
Thus, participants provided valuations of two individual items and one combination set that 
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included both items. In contrast to Study 4, the population from which the items were drawn was 
not provided (i.e., no array including twelve tokens of the two novel items was provided; see 
Figure 7). This design decision was made for three reasons: (a) To simplify the task (i.e., the 
absence of the array reduces processing demands), (b) To tease apart the relative value of AB 
(together) vs. Item A + Item B (individually); having fewer items should make the distinction 
more acute (i.e., fewer of each item may highlight the value of variety, as there are fewer 
comparisons to consider), and (c) Each trial still included the same ratio of items as presented in 
the Equal condition in Study 4. As in the prior study, the varied set appeared in each location two 
times (left, center, right), resulting in all participants completing six trials. Across participants, 
the items used, and the location of the items (top vs. bottom) in the varied set, were 
counterbalanced. See Figure 8 for a sample trial. 
Procedure 
 The same procedure for children (including entry criterion based on a pretest) and adults 
as described in Study 4 was used.  
Results 
As in Study 4, the values of the sets were averaged and then log transformed. The values 
of the single-item choices were summed within each trial and then averaged across trials, 
whereas the varied sets were simply averaged across trials. To test whether participants place a 
premium on variety compared to the value assigned to the items that comprised the varied set, I 
compared the value of the three choices. A repeated measures ANOVA with choice-type 
(Variety, Single-Item) as the within-participants factor and age group (6-7, 8-9, Adults) as the 
between-participants factor yielded only a main effect of age group, F(2, 97) = 3.54, p = .033, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .07. To account for multiple comparisons, the alpha level was again set to .017 (.05/3 age 
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groups). Children 8-9 years overall valued the choices at lower levels than children 6-7 years (6-
7: 1.29; 8-9: 1.00; Adults: 1.17; p = .009). No effect of choice-type nor interaction between 
choice-type and age group was observed. Children and adults assigned similar values to Item A + 
Item B independently as they did to Set AB (scores for the average of the individual items A and 
B vs. the set of A+B are as follows: 6-7 years: 1.38 vs. 1.21; 8-9 years: .99 vs. 1.01; Adults: 1.17 
vs. 1.16; see Figure 9). 
Discussion 
 In Study 4, participants placed a higher value on varied sets compared to non-varied sets. 
That is, Set AB was given a higher value than the average of Set AA and Set BB. Study 5 tested 
one possible mechanism underlying this added value—i.e., whether participants place a premium 
on variety itself. By presenting participants with three choices—Item A, Item B, and Set AB—I 
removed the possibility of a same-item decrement (i.e., diminishing return), thus enabling me to 
directly test whether children and adults place an absolute premium on variety itself. Results 
revealed that participants did not place a higher value on varied sets than would be expected 
based on their valuations of the individual items that comprised each set; thus, the conclusion 
that the added value associated with variety is due to some boost above and beyond the expected 
value is not supported.  
This study demonstrates the limits of the value of variety, although it was not designed to 
directly reveal why. The possibility I favor is that the added value assigned to varied sets may be 
due to the diminished value assigned to additional units of the same item, rather than a premium 
placed on variety per se. However, this remains speculative, as I did not directly measure the 
relative values of Item A vs. Set AA. Furthermore, there are several aspects of the design that 
may have underestimated variety effects in this study. First, the null finding may be due to not 
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providing the population from which the items were drawn (a design difference across Studies 4 
and 5). Without knowledge of item representation, it may have been harder for participants to 
determine value; however, this seems unlikely given that varied sets were valued more than non-
varied sets even after collapsing across set type in Study 4’s Scarcity condition (where one item 
was scarce relative to another, 10:2). Second, it is possible that the added value that would be 
assigned to a varied set in this context was too low to detect, given that participants were 
required to respond with whole-dollar amounts. For example, it would have not been possible for 
a participant to indicate that Item A = $1, Item B =$3, and Set AB = $4.25. In order for a variety 
premium to be detected here, the participant would have had to value Set AB at $5, yielding a 
25% premium vs. 6% if valued at $4.25. However, this could not entirely explain the results, 
given the effect of variety in Study 4, which used the same method. Lastly, it is possible that 
participants treated the task as an arithmetic problem, and therefore simply added (or 
approximated) the value of Item A + Item B to arrive at their value for Set AB. Although this 
strategy was not employed in Study 4 (as I did obtain a variety boost in monetary value in that 
study), that more complex set of comparisons may have simply made it harder to “do the math.” 
STUDY 6 
In Study 6, I further test the limits of a variety preference by examining whether children 
(and adults as a comparison group) will forego an additional unit of a preferred item to obtain a 
varied set. In this way, Study 6 moves beyond the prior studies in this dissertation to explicitly 
pit preference for an individual item against a preference for variety. Results from Studies 1-3 
show that children and adults prefer variety irrespective of the relative availability of the items 
represented, and results from Study 4 suggest that this preference may be linked to the increased 
value assigned to those varied sets. Study 5 did not find a variety boost, but this may be due to 
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the availability of a different strategy (i.e., treating the task as an arithmetic problem). The 
purpose of Study 6 is to test whether a preference for variety extends to situations where one 
item is preferred to another (e.g., is Set AB preferred to Set AA or Set BB, even when there is a 
preference for Item A over Item B?). Selecting variety in this case requires foregoing a second 
more-preferred item in favor of a less-preferred item, providing a stronger test of one’s 
commitment to obtaining variety.  
To test participants’ commitment to variety, I use consumable food items, which allows 
for a stronger test of a variety preference. As with many durable items, like a pen, a single token 
of that item may be sufficient. After all, people generally only use one pen at a time. In turn, 
selecting among durable items may amplify a preference for variety. Contrastingly, consumable 
items do not have this same limitation—there is value in consuming more than one cookie (or 
even selecting one cookie for now and one cookie for later). In addition, variety selections 
among durable items potentially have the added confound of increased functionality. That is, by 
selecting a varied set among durable items, individuals can obtain not only a varied set of kinds, 
but can also obtain a varied set of functions (e.g., selecting a pen and a marker allows someone 
to sketch and highlight). The functionality of food items, however, is relatively equated—foods 
within sets are intended to be eaten.  
In order to provide a stronger test of variety, Study 6 included familiar items, for which 
participants may have an a priori preference. Recall also that Studies 1-5 included unknown, 
novel items matched in color and size; participants had little reason to prefer one item to another, 
as items within sets were similar and their functions were unknown. By minimizing the amount 
of information provided about the items, and maximizing their similarity, participants had little 
basis for forming a preference. Thus, there was no reason to expect that children (or adults) had 
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clear, stable preferences for one item over another. Given the inclusion of familiar items, I can 
test more directly whether a preference for variety overrides a preference for multiple units of a 
preferred item. For example, if a participant prefers carrots to broccoli, a stronger preference for 
variety may move a participant to select a varied set containing a carrot and a piece of broccoli 
over a set containing two carrots. If this trend is observed (i.e., foregoing an additional unit of a 
preferred item to achieve variety), then I will have further evidence that variety is directly 
valued. Alternatively, variety may be preferred in only those instances where one food item is 
not preferred to another—which would be consistent with results observed in Studies 1-3. 
Finally, I ask participants to make choices rather than provide monetary valuations. By 
asking participants to make choices, I circumvent some of the issues identified previously 
regarding asking for monetary valuations (e.g., sensitivity concerns by requiring whole dollar 
amounts, excluding younger children because they are unable to provide consistent valuations, 
and preventing people from reducing the task to a math test). Lastly, the present study moves 
beyond prior work examining effects of variety on food selections in children (e.g., Just et al., 
2012; Roe et al., 2013) by directly testing whether varied food sets are preferred to non-varied 
food sets.   
Methods 
Participants 
 Participants included 120 children 4-9 years subdivided into three age groups: 4-5 years 
(n = 41, M = 5.17 years, SD = .60 years, 25 females, 16 years), 6-7 years (n = 41, M = 6.93 years, 
SD = .59 years, 21 females, 20 males), and 8-9 years (n = 38, M = 8.94 years, SD = .63 years, 25 
females, 13 males), and 41 adults (M = 19.17, SD = 1.14 years, 25 females, 16 males). An 
additional two children were excluded: one due to parental inference and one due to 
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experimenter error. Parents identified their children as White (58%), Black (3%), Asian (8%), 
Multiracial (11%), and other (5%); the remaining parents did not identify their children’s race. 
Adults identified themselves as White (54%), Black (2%), Asian (32%), Multiracial (5%), and 
other (5%); the remaining adults did not report on their race. Eighteen additional children 4-5 
years (M = 5.07 years, SD = .51 years, 6 females, 12 males; parents identified their children as 
White (61%), Asian (11%), and Multiracial (6%); the remaining parents did not report on their 
race) participated in a pretest only. Children were recruited from laboratory spaces in museums 
in a university city in the midwestern United States; adults were recruited from a university 
Psychology subject pool in the same city. Children were compensated with a small thank-you 
gift; adults received course credit. Children were compensated with a small thank-you gift; adults 
received course credit. 
Materials 
 Materials included photographs of 12 paired food items displayed on a computer screen. 
The pairs included: carrot + broccoli, animal cracker + graham cracker, snack cracker + cheese 
cracker, gummy bear + marshmallow, and apple slice + orange slice. Sixteen food pictures were 
pretested to select a set of 12 items that even the youngest children (4-5 years) could correctly 
identify by sight. We selected those items that had the highest familiarity, as indicated by 
children either correctly labeling the item, or agreeing with a correct label provided by the 
experimenter. Familiarity of the 12 items included ranged from 83-100% (M = 94%, SD = 5%).  
In addition to these 12 food items, photographs of two balls (two tokens of the same ball) 
and two pencils (one whole, one broken) were included in a warm-up task.  
Design 
 Each experimental trial (six total) included one token each of two food items. Participants 
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were first asked to identify which of two food items they preferred, or whether they liked them 
about the same. The location of the individual food items was counterbalanced across 
participants (left, right). Participants were then asked to select a set of items they would like for 
themselves among three available. For this choice question, the placement of the varied set was 
counterbalanced within participants (left, center, right). The presentation of the trials themselves 
was randomized within Qualtrics. After the last trial, participants were asked why they selected 
the set that they did. This was done only after the last trial so as to not influence choices made on 
prior trials. These responses were included for exploratory purposes only and will not be 
discussed further. See Figure 10 for a sample trial. 
Procedure 
 Children. Children received written parental consent and provided oral assent, then met 
with an experimenter individually. Children first completed a warm-up task designed to make 
sure they were comfortable expressing preferences. In this task, they were shown two items and 
asked to indicate which of the two they preferred for two trials. On one trial, children were asked 
to identify which of two balls (two tokens of the same ball) they liked better, or whether they 
liked them about the same. In another trial, children were asked to identify which of two pencils 
(one whole, one broken) they liked better, or whether they liked them about the same. The order 
of warm-up trials was randomized within Qualtrics. 
 After completing the warm-up task, children moved directly to the main task. For each of 
the six experimental items, they first were shown two items [A and B] and asked, “Which do you 
like better: [label for left item], [label for right item], or are they about the same?” On the next 
screen, children were shown three sets of items from which to choose [AA, BB, AB] and asked 
to “Choose one set that you would like for yourself.” After the last trial, children were asked: 
 59 
“Why did you choose this set?” For example, if a trial included an animal cracker and a graham 
cracker, a child would hear: “Which do you like better: the animal cracker, the graham cracker, 
or are they about the same?” Following the child’s selection, they would then be asked to 
“Choose one set that you would like for yourself” and the sets would include: animal cracker + 
animal cracker, animal cracker + graham cracker, and graham cracker + graham cracker. 
 Adults. After providing consent, adults completed the same task as children.  
Results 
Total Variety Selections  
As a first step, I tallied the number of trials on which participants selected a varied set, 
irrespective of whether they indicated a preference for one of the two items comprising any one 
of the six sets. I then conducted a one-way ANOVA testing whether variety selections differed 
by age group (4-5, 6-7, 8-9, Adults). Results revealed that the selection of varied sets did not 
differ by age group, F(3, 157) = .08, p = .972, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00. Children and adults selected varied sets 
at similar rates (4-5: 2.41; 6-7: 2.41; 8-9: 2.55; Adults: 2.51; Overall: 2.47). I next tested whether 
participants selected varied sets significantly above chance (where chance = 2), collapsing across 
age groups given the lack of age group effect. Results revealed that, overall, participants selected 
varied sets significantly above chance, t(160) = 3.84, p < .001; however, when tested by age 
group, only children 8-9 years and adults selected varied sets significantly above chance (ps ≤ 
.035). See Figure 11 for variety selections by age group. 
Variety Selections on No-Preference Trials 
 I tallied the number of trials on which participants indicated having no preference for one 
of the two items presented. Results from a one-way ANOVA revealed that the number of no-
preference trials did not differ as a function of age group, F(3, 157) = 1.21, p = .307, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02 (4-
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5: 2.56; 6-7: 2.27; 8-9: 2.26; Adults: 1.95; Overall: 2.26).  
I next calculated the proportion of trials on which participants selected varied sets given 
no preference. In order to be included in this analysis, participants must have indicated having no 
preference on at least one trial (n = 141; 88%). Results from a one-way ANOVA revealed no 
difference as a function of age group, F(3, 137) = 1.14, p = .334, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02 (4-5: .66; 6-7: .77; 7-8: 
.72; Adults: .82; Overall: .74). See Table 1 for a complete overview of the proportion of different 
set-types selected on no-preference trials.  
Lastly, I tested whether participants selected varied sets significantly above chance 
(where chance = .33), collapsing across age group given the lack of age group effect. Results 
revealed that, overall, participants selected varied sets significantly above chance, t(140) = 13.11, 
p < .001, and this result held up across all age groups (ps < .001). See Figure 12. 
Variety Selections on Preference Trials 
Turning to trials where preferences were identified, I first tallied the number of trials on 
which participants indicating having a preference for one of the two items. Results from a one-
way ANOVA revealed no significant effect of age group, F(3, 157) = 1.21, p = .307, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02 (4-
5: 3.44; 6-7: 3.73 8-9: 3.74; Adults: 4.05; Overall: 3.74).  
I next calculated the proportion of trials on which participants selected varied sets given 
an initial preference. In order to be included in this analysis, participants must have identified 
having a preference on at least one trial (n = 157; 98%). Results from a one-way ANOVA 
revealed that the proportion of varied sets selected after indicating a preference did not vary by 
age group, F(3, 153) = .18, p = .912, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00 (4-5: .20; 6-7: .20; 7-8: .19; Adults: .23; Overall: 
.21). See Table 1 for a complete overview of the proportion of different set-types selected on 
preference trials. 
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As before, I tested whether participants selected varied sets significantly above chance 
(where chance = .33), collapsing across age group given the lack of age group effect. Results 
revealed that, overall, participants selected varied sets significantly below chance, t(156) = -6.20, 
p < .001, and this result held up across all age groups (ps ≤ .012). See Figure 13.  
Discussion 
 Overall, participants selected varied food sets significantly above chance, conceptually 
replicating results from Studies 1-3. In addition, when restricting the analysis to include only 
those participants who indicated having no preference on at least one trial, the proportion of 
varied selections was significantly above chance. That is, given indecision (or uncertainty), 
participants opted to diversify their selections rather than select sets comprising identical food 
items. This is particularly interesting because variety should have lower value in this context; 
additional units of the same food type retain their value more than that of many non-food items. 
Yet, participants still sought out variety at relatively high rates given no preference for either 
item available.   
Of note, however, is the attenuation of the variety preference across this item category. 
Studies 1-3 included unfamiliar, novel items, which participants selected at relatively high rates 
irrespective of condition (i.e., distributing to self and/or other). When asked to make selections 
within a familiar category, variety was in competition with a priori preferences. Given an 
established preference, participants often selected same-item sets comprising only the preferred 
item, eliminating the strong preference previously observed for variety. Thus, Study 6 provides 
insight into the limits of a variety preference. Across the age range, participants’ preference for a 
given item overrode their preference for variety. That is, participants did not forego an additional 
unit of a preferred food item to achieve a varied set.  
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STUDY 7 
 In Study 6, one could argue that requiring participants to indicate a preference before 
selecting among sets prompted participants to want to appear consistent, undermining the 
tendency to select variety. For example, if a participant indicated preferring a carrot to a piece of 
broccoli, then they may have felt compelled to select the set including two carrots rather than the 
varied set. To test whether requiring participants to first indicate whether they liked one of two 
items better contributed to the patterns obtained in Study 6, Study 7 systematically varied the 
order of the tasks. Thus, if participants sought to appear consistent after indicating a preference 
for one of two items, then variety selections should be greater when preferences are elicited after 
selecting among the available sets. Given the lack of age differences in Study 6, only adults were 
included in Study 7.  
Participants 
 Participants included 103 adults (M = 34 years, SD = 9 years, 43 females, 58 males, 2 
unreported) who characterized themselves as White (76%), Black (7%), Asian (4%), Multiracial 
(2%), and other (10%); the remaining adults did not report on their race. Adults were recruited 
through MTurk. An additional eight participants were excluded for starting but not finishing the 
task. To be eligible to participate, adult MTurk workers must have had an approval rating greater 
than or equal to 95, have completed at least 100 approved tasks, and have been located in the 
United States. Adults were compensated $0.60, a competitive rate for a task of this length.  
Materials 
 The same materials from Study 6 were used.  
Design 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Order 1 (where 
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participants were asked to identify which of two items they liked better first) or Order 2 (where 
participants were asked to identify which of the two items they liked better after selecting among 
the sets comprising those items). All other aspects of the design remained the same as described 
in Study 6.  
Procedure 
 In the Order 1 condition, the tasks were ordered as described in Study 6. In the Order 2 
condition, participants first indicated which of three sets they would like for themselves (AA, 
BB, AB), and then indicated which of the two items they liked better (A, B) or whether they 
liked them about the same. 
Results 
Total Variety Selections 
I tallied the number of trials on which participants selected a varied set, irrespective of 
whether they indicated a preference for one of the two items comprising any one of the six sets, 
and tested whether selections differed by condition. Results from a t-test revealed that the 
selection of varied sets did not differ by condition, t(101) = 1.90, p = .061. Participants in the two 
conditions selected varied sets at similar rates (Order 1: M = 2.04; Order 2: M = 1.50; out of 6 
trials). I next tested whether participants selected varied sets significantly above chance (where 
chance = 2), collapsing across condition given the lack of condition effect. Results revealed that 
participants did not differ from chance, t(102) = -1.68, p = .096. Note, however, that when 
variety selections were tested against chance by condition, participants selected varied sets at 
chance in the Order 1 condition and significantly below chance in the Order 2 condition (p = 
.010). See Figure 11.  
Variety Selections on No Preference Trials 
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 In line with Study 6, I tallied the number of trials on which participants indicated having 
no preference for one of the two items presented. The number of no-preference trials was similar 
across conditions, t(101) = .70, p = .483 (Order 1: 1.33; Order 2: 1.13). I next calculated the 
proportion of trials on which participants selected varied sets given no preference. In order to be 
included in this analysis, participants must have indicated having no preference on at least one 
trial (n = 58; 56%). Results revealed that the proportion of varied sets selected after indicating no 
preference did not vary by condition, t(56) = .44, p = .663 (Order 1: .87; Order 2: .83). See Table 
1 for a complete overview of the proportion of different set-types selected on no-preference 
trials. 
 Lastly, I tested whether participants selected varied sets significantly above chance 
(where chance = .33), collapsing across condition given the lack of condition effect. Results 
revealed that, overall, participants selected varied sets significantly above chance, t(57) = 12.64, 
p < .001, and this result held up across conditions (ps < .001). See Figure 12. 
Variety Selections on Preference Trials  
As above, I first tallied the number of trials on which participants indicated having a 
preference for one of the two items presented; the number of preference trials did not differ by 
condition, t(56) = .04, p = .971 (Order 1: 3.83; Order 2: 3.82). I next calculated the proportion of 
trials on which participants indicating having a preference for one of the two items presented. In 
order to be included in this analysis, participants must have indicated having a preference on at 
least one trial (n = 103; 100%). Results revealed that the proportion of varied sets selected after 
indicating a preference did not vary by condition, t(101) = 1.64, p = .104 (Order 1: .17; Order 2: 
.10). See Table 1.  
Lastly, I tested whether participants selected varied sets significantly above chance 
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(where chance = .33), collapsing across condition given the lack of condition effect. Results 
revealed that, overall, participants selected varied sets significantly below chance, t(102) = -9.53, 
p < .001, and this result held up across conditions (ps < .001). See Figure 13.  
Discussion 
 The purpose of Study 7 was to test whether adults’ selections of varied sets differed 
depending on the order in which preferences for one of the two items in a set were elicited—i.e., 
whether they were asked prior to selecting among sets of items (Order 1), or whether they were 
asked following selecting among sets of items (Order 2). Results revealed that order condition 
did not influence any key results associated with variety selections, suggesting that the 
attenuation of the variety preference observed in Study 6 was not simply due to participants 
wanting to appear consistent in their selections. Though not significant, the difference in means 
was in fact the opposite direction of what would be predicted had a desire for consistency 
influenced variety selections. In addition, these results replicate those observed in Study 6, 
further underscoring the influence of individual item preferences on variety selections.   
General Discussion 
 The studies in Chapter 3 were designed to explore the mechanisms underlying the variety 
preference observed in Studies 1-3, as well as the strength of the preference itself. To examine 
mechanisms, I designed tasks asking children (and adults as a comparison group) to provide 
monetary valuations of items and sets used in Studies 1-3 (Studies 4-5). To test strength, I 
manipulated key elements of the decision context including the relative availability of items 
included in sets (Study 4) and whether a preference for variety overrode a preference for a 
particular item (Studies 6-7). Overall, these studies are the first, to my knowledge, to examine 
children’s direct motivations to select variety, and contribute to an established body of work 
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examining variety seeking in adults. 
 In Study 4, children (6-9 years) and adults placed higher monetary valuations on varied 
sets compared to non-varied sets. In this study, participants indicated how much people would 
pay for different sets of items given different populations from which the sets were drawn. In the 
Equal condition, participants provided valuations for sets that included two types of items that 
were equally represented in the population (6:6); in the Scarcity condition, participants provided 
valuations for sets that included two types of items differing in their relative availability (10:2). 
Though age differences were not observed in the Equal condition, a developmental shift occurred 
in the Scarcity condition—children 6-7 years placed a higher value on varied sets compared to 
non-varied sets including two scarce items (Same-Scarce) whereas adults valued these types of 
sets equally. In total, results from Study 4 demonstrate that variety does confer a higher value; 
however, it is not valued necessarily uniquely above other factors (e.g., relative availability) at 
least for older children and adults. More generally, this added value may motivate the selection 
of varied sets, particularly in cases where items are unknown or “all things are equal.” Had the 
preference for variety in Studies 1-3 merely reflected participants’ indecision (i.e., if someone is 
wavering between a choice of A or a choice of B, then the selection of the varied set can be a 
way of avoiding a decision), participants would have provided equal monetary values for varied 
and non-varied sets. Given that participants deemed that the varied set had extra value, this 
raised the question of why, giving rise to Study 5.  
 In Study 5, the added monetary value associated with variety appeared not to be a 
premium placed on variety itself. After asking children (6-9 years) and adults to place monetary 
valuations on individual items as well as sets comprising those individual items, results revealed 
that variety received no added monetary boost—the total values placed on individual items 
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comprising sets and the sets themselves were comparable. These results are consistent with the 
notion that added value associated with variety reflects diminished utility of additional units of 
the same item. At the same time, however, subsequent work is required to directly test this (e.g., 
assess participants’ valuations of Item A vs. Set AA). Alternatively, it is possible that 
participants reduced the task to a simple arithmetic problem (A + B = ?) due to the simultaneous 
presence of all three choices. This alternative, too, should be addressed in future work (e.g., 
assess participants’ valuations of Item A, Item, B, and Set AB sequentially—i.e., mixed in with 
other trials to reduce the likelihood that individual valuations can be recalled and tracked). 
Lastly, it is possible that packaging items together (i.e., bundling) to create varied sets yielded 
lower valuations of the items comprising the set given that bundling decreases variety selections 
(Mittelman et al., 2014). Subsequent work should directly test the influence of bundling on 
children’s valuations of varied sets.  
 Turning to Study 6, results revealed that children (4-9 years) and adults selected varied 
sets above chance overall, consistent with results from Studies 1-3. However, there was a marked 
effect of whether one food item in a set was preferred to the other. When one item was not 
preferred to the other, both children and adults were much more likely to select sets comprising 
both food items available. In contrast, when one item was preferred to another, both children and 
adults rarely selected the varied set, instead typically selecting two instances of the preferred 
food item. Results from Study 7 with adults revealed that the order in which preferences were 
elicited (i.e., whether participants indicated which of two items they preferred before or after 
making selections among the sets comprising those items) did not affect selection of varied sets. 
This result suggests that the lack of a variety choice in Study 6 was not due to participants 
attempting to be consistent in their answers. Because adults should be most highly motivated to 
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maintain consistency given their more advanced metacognitive abilities, children were not 
subsequently tested because they are not predicted to show an order effect, consistent with 
adults.    
 Given the complexities of the variety preference, the present studies are limited in their 
explanatory power. For example, familiar consumable items were used in Studies 6 and 7, and it 
is possible that the attenuation of the variety preference reflects the use of this type of item. 
Therefore, it is an open question whether variety would be similarly selected had I used familiar 
durable items for which additional units of the same item may yield even less utility (i.e., the 
decrease in utility across two potato chips is likely less than the decrease in utility across two 
regular pens, because a person can eat two potato chips in a sitting but likely would need only 
one pen at a time). More generally, it is possible that variety seeking in childhood is higher for 
unfamiliar than familiar items. This, too, requires additional testing, as the present studies were 
not designed to disentangle the contributions of item-type to overall variety selections. Rather, 
items across studies were selected purposely to probe the limits and strength of the preference 
itself. For this reason, the present studies serve as a systematic entry into a larger line of work 
needed to fully understand the emergence and developmental course of variety seeking in 
childhood. Despite these limitations, Studies 4-6 reveal that variety valuation and selection are 
relatively stable irrespective of item type across the age range and into adulthood, as evidenced 
by few age group differences.  
 The early emergence and relative stability of a variety preference suggests that attention 
to variety may be evolutionarily advantageous, and perhaps not just for basic survival. Variety 
guards against boredom and may even support innovation. For example, people may create 
variation that did not exist previously (e.g., just consider the many types of cakes available at a 
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bakery). In this way, variety, at least loosely, promotes societal advancement—though this claim 
requires empirical support. Importantly, though, because the youngest children in the present 
studies were 4-5 years, and thus already had several years of experience, subsequent work should 
test whether attention to variety emerges even earlier in childhood. For example, attention to 
variety could be tested in infancy via preferential looking tasks.  
 Moving forward, I see three natural next steps. First, the mechanism underlying the added 
value associated with variety requires further testing. Though evidence from Studies 4-5 suggests 
that there is a value decrement associated with additional units of the same item, this was not 
empirically tested. Subsequent work should test whether this is the case—i.e., whether children 
(and adults as a comparison group) assign greater value to Item A + Item A compared to Set AA. 
Second, prior work with adults has shown that bundling decreases variety selections (Mittelman, 
et al., 2014). In Studies 4-6, I held the presentation of variety sets constant—variety was always 
represented as a set and not as the sequential selection of two items. It is possible that variety 
selections would be boosted, particularly in Studies 6-7, had participants been asked to select two 
items sequentially. Thus, subsequent work should manipulate the process by which sets are 
obtained (e.g., simultaneous vs. sequential selection) to determine when sensitivity to different 
selection schemes emerges. Lastly, because the present work was not designed to disentangle the 
effects of durable vs. consumable items on variety selections, additional work is needed to 
understand the strength of the variety preference across different item categories—including, but 
not limited to, durable vs. consumable items. For example, variety seeking varies as a function of 
hedonic vs. utilitarian product types such that source of the switching within these categories 
differs (i.e., sensory satiation leads to variety seeking with hedonic products whereas functional 
satiation leads to variety seeking with utilitarian products; Baltas, Kokkinaki, & Loukopoulou, 
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2017). Taken together, subsequent work in these areas will inform our understanding of 
children’s direct and derived motivations to select variety.  
 As attention to variety seeking in childhood increases, it will be important to track the 
motivations for selecting variety in any one context, as work here and with adults demonstrates 
that variety selections are sensitive to a multitude of contextual influences. This will be 
especially important given the implications of this kind of work on the development of 
interventions to promote better decision making in children. For example, given children’s 
preference for varied sets, variety has been proposed as one strategy to promote healthier eating 
in children (Albuquerque et al., 2017). Thus, better understanding when and why children prefer 
variety can yield actionable results that can be used to inform how we help children make 
decisions. 
Conclusions 
 The present research adds to our understanding of the mechanisms underlying a variety 
preference as well as the strengths and limits of this preference in childhood. Across four studies, 
variety was shown to confer a higher value relative to same-item pairs and be selected in 
situations where preferences for items were similar. In general, findings across the age range (4-9 
years) into adulthood were relatively stable, as evidenced by few age group differences, 
suggesting that the preference itself operates similarly across the lifespan. In light of these 
findings, there are several opportunities for future research. For example, is the added value 
associated with variety a result of a same-item decrement in same-item sets? Does the means by 
which a variety set is achieved influence variety selections? Does variety seeking vary across 
item categories? Lastly, how can variety be leveraged to help children (and adults) make better 
decisions? As these questions demonstrate, variety seeking in childhood is relatively unexplored, 
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resulting in much territory left to be discovered.  
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Figure 6. Sample varied sets used in Equal and Scarce trials (Study 4). Participants were first 
shown the complete set, then asked to determine how much people would pay for each set drawn 
from that complete set.  
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Figure 7. Valuations placed on varied sets during Equal and Scarce trials (Study 4). Mean 
values (log-transformed dollars) placed on sets during Equal (top) and Scarcity (bottom) trials by 
pair-type and age group. 
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Figure 8. Sample trial of individual items and varied set (Study 5). Participants were asked to 
determine how much people would pay for each individual item and the varied set.  
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Figure 9. Valuations placed on individual and varied sets of items (Study 5). Mean values 
(log-transformed dollars) placed on individuals (A plus B) vs. sets comprising individual items 
(AB), by age group. 
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Figure 10. Sample food trial (Studies 6-7). Participants first identify which of two food items 
they prefer (or indicate that they are liked about the same). They then indicate which set of items 
would like for themselves.  
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Table 1 
 
Proportion of set-type selections on no-preference and preference trials.  
 
  No-Preference Trials 4-5 years 6-7 years 8-9 years Adults Overall 
Study 
6 
Variety Selections .66 (.40) .77 (.34) .72 (.41) .82 (.34) .74 (.38) 
Non-Preference Selections .34 (.40) .23 (.34) .28 (.41) .18 (.34) .26 (.38) 
       
  No-Preference Trials     Order 1 Order 2 Overall 
Study 
7 
Variety Selections   .87 (.28) .83 (.35) .85 (.31) 
Non-Preference Selections   .13 (.28) .17 (.35) .15 (.31) 
       
  Preference Trials 4-5 years 6-7 years 8-9 years Adults Overall 
Study 
6 
Variety Selections .20 (.30) .20 (.25) .19 (.22) .23 (.24) .21 (.25) 
Preference Selections .70 (.35) .76 (.25) .80 (.22) .76 (.24) .75 (.27) 
Non-Preference Selections .10 (.24) .04 (.13) .01 (.05) .01 (.04) .04 (.14) 
       
  Preference Trials     Order 1 Order 2 Overall 
Study 
7 
Variety Selections   .17 (.22) .10 (.19) .14 (.21) 
Preference Selections   .81 (.24) .85 (.24) .83 (.24) 
Non-Preference Selections   .02 (.09) .05 (.13) .04 (.11) 
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Figure 11. Number of varied sets selected overall (Studies 6-7). Mean number of varied sets 
selected overall by age group (Study 6) and condition (Study 7). Note that Study 7 only included 
adults. 
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Figure 12. Varied sets selected given no preference (Studies 6-7). Mean proportion of varied 
sets selected given no preference indicated on at least one trial by age group (Study 6) and 
condition (Study 7). Note that Study 7 only included adults. 
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Figure 13. Varied sets selected given a preference (Studies 6-7). Mean proportion of varied 
sets selected given a preference indicated on at least one trial by age group (Study 6) and 
condition (Study 7). Note that Study 7 only included adults. 
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Chapter 4: General Discussion 
 
Across seven studies, I tested children’s and adults’ direct motivations to select scarce 
items and varied sets. In Chapter 2, participants were asked to select one (Scarcity task) or two 
(Variety task) items from a set of two novel items that differed in their relative availability. 
Results revealed an early-emerging preference for variety but not scarcity, suggesting that 
variety has inherent value—i.e., variety is selected for the sake of obtaining it independent of 
other factors. In contrast, there was no early-emerging preference for scarcity per se, at least in 
this task. Additional work is needed to determine why participants in these studies showed little 
scarcity preference. One possibility is that items in Studies 1-3 were not scarce enough. Even 
when maximally scarce, scarce items were still represented at a ratio of 5:1. It is possible that 
participants would have been directly motivated to select scarce items had they been represented 
at a higher abundant-scarce ratio (e.g., 50:1). Similarly, because items were unfamiliar, their 
relative value and broader prevalence in the world were unknown. It is possible that participants 
would have been directly motivated to select scarce items had they had knowledge of the items’ 
base rates and identities. Using unfamiliar items may have shifted participants’ attention toward 
discerning the type/function of an item rather than its relative availability. Turning to context, it 
is possible that competition is required for a scarcity preference to emerge. Study 2 did not 
explicitly test whether competition yielded increased selection of scarce items. Instead, 
participants could have interpreted the two-person design (i.e., asking participants to select for 
themselves and an unknown other) as an opportunity to cooperate. In addition, because the other 
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person was unknown, participants were free to assume the other recipient’s identity (e.g., 
participants could have assumed the unknown other was a friend or stranger). Lastly, it is 
possible that participants would have been motivated to select scarce items had they had 
knowledge of the source of the scarcity (e.g., items that are scarce due to popularity are preferred 
to items that are scarce due to unpopularity); however, this last point would not be consistent 
with a direct motivation to select scarce items, as the motivation is rooted in an external force. 
Beyond the possibilities for which a scarcity preference may have not been obtained, 
children and adults behaved similarly across the present tasks. In the case of variety, this 
suggests that a preference for variety emerges early and may be consistent across the lifespan. 
For scarcity, however, the present results bring into question the oft-made assumption that 
scarcity in and of itself increases value (e.g., Mittone & Savadori, 2009). Scarce items were not 
selected at high rates, and in most cases selected at chance, suggesting that a general scarcity bias 
is not limitless. 
In Chapter 3, I examined potential mechanisms underlying participants’ preference for 
variety as well as the strength and limits of the preference itself. To test mechanisms, participants 
were asked to indicate how much people would pay for different sets of items. If participants 
valued variety and non-variety similarly, then the selection of varied sets in Studies 1-3 likely 
reflected indecision (i.e., “splitting the difference”). In contrast, if participants valued variety 
more than non-variety, then the added value associated with variety could be rooted in either 
utility maximization (whereby additional units of the same item are devalued) or hedging 
(whereby variety receives an absolute boost relative to the value of individual items). Results 
revealed that both children and adults assigned higher monetary values to varied sets compared 
to same-item sets, thus demonstrating that a variety preference is unlikely to reflect merely an 
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inability to decide among two choices. At the same time, however, the added value was not 
associated with a premium per se, as the value of a varied set was equivalent to the value of the 
sum of the component items. Rather, the source of the added value of variety is likely rooted in 
decreased value associated with subsequent units of the same items (i.e., the value of AA is 
worth less than two times A)—in line with proposals suggesting that variety offers opportunities 
to maximize utility (e.g., Kahn, 1995; McAlister, 1982).  
Lastly, results from Chapter 3 revealed that the variety preference is limited. On sets for 
which participants preferred one food item to another, the preference for variety was reduced, 
suggesting that a preference for variety is strongest in contexts where items are equivalent in 
value. In this way, children and adults consider both variety and differential item value and 
flexibly privilege one factor (i.e., preference for an individual item vs. variety) over another. 
Subsequent work should examine whether and when children privilege variety over preference 
for an individual item. Overall, these dissertation data are the first, to my knowledge, to report on 
children’s direct motivations to select variety and offer insight into how children determine item 
value.  
A key goal of this dissertation is to understand the building blocks of value. Thus, these 
results have implications for our understanding of children as developing consumers. By taking a 
developmental approach to the study of consumer behavior, this line of work offers a unique 
opportunity to test the robustness of existing theories to development. For example, given that 
these studies reveal relatively few age group differences in performance, these data suggest that a 
basic variety preference may emerge relatively early and be unchanging. At the same time, I 
would expect additional factors that adults may use to determine value to change considerably 
with age. For example, adults have been shown to select variety as a means to appear more 
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interesting (e.g., Ratner & Kahn, 2002). At what age are children similarly motivated to select 
variety to appear interesting? Similarly, children may need more information to reason about the 
value (or lack of value) of scarce items. Children’s attention to and use of information regarding 
scarce items requires additional empirical testing. For example, do children reason that items 
scarce due to being popular are more valuable than items scarce due to accidental loss? More 
generally, additional work is needed, as mentioned above, to conclude that children and adults 
are not directly motivated to select scarce items as they are variety. It may be the case that 
simply shifting from novel to familiar items would yield a scarcity bias (or shifting from a sparse 
context to a familiar context like a store), as the added information associated with knowing what 
items are may prompt participants to select those that are less available. For example, framing 
the same novel items used in Studies 1-5 as toys in a toy store may push participants to select 
scarce toys, as participants may infer that less-available toys are more popular or in higher 
demand. In this way, the context is familiar, even if the items are not, and participants can bring 
real-world knowledge regarding shopping and toy stores to bear on their decision making. 
Overall, by approaching consumer behavior from a developmental perspective, we can 
better account for change over time and discern what is developmentally most basic. Behaviors 
associated with sophisticated processes in adulthood may actually be rooted in more basic 
capacities that come online in childhood. In contrast, behaviors that require additional knowledge 
and more sophisticated processing may emerge only in adulthood. In this way, the 
developmental approach allows for identifying mechanisms giving rise to behaviors and testing 
the influence of related cognitive capacities on children’s decision making. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Because the purpose of the present research was to test children’s use of two possible 
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fundamental cues to value—scarcity and variety—the results are limited in their explanatory 
reach. Studies 1-5, in particular, were designed to assess direct motivations to use these cues, and 
thus provided as little information about the items as possible to isolate the effects of scarcity 
(relative availability) and variety per se on selections and valuations. For this reason, it is not 
possible to extend findings to contexts where more information is available to act on (e.g., 
information about for whom selections are being made, information about the source of the 
scarcity)—a conclusion supported by results from Studies 6-7, where variety was selected at a 
lower level when participants preferred one item to another compared to when they liked the 
food items similarly. Thus, when children (and adults) have more knowledge and familiarity 
with items, the use of scarcity and variety may increase or decrease as a result of competing 
preferences.  
In addition, it is not entirely clear what should be concluded about scarcity and value. 
Selection was used as a proxy for value in Studies 1-3 and scarce items were selected at 
relatively low rates, especially when compared to variety selections. However, in Study 2, a self-
other difference emerged when the scarce item was maximally scarce such that participants 
preferred to distribute the scarce item to themselves over someone else. Also, I observed a 
developmental shift in the valuations children and adults placed on varied sets that included one 
scarce item. These latter findings suggest that, at some level, children and adults were attending 
to relative availability (scarcity) in these tasks. However, if scarce items truly in and of 
themselves had greater value, I would expect greater selections of them in Studies 1-3. For this 
reason, subsequent work is needed to better understand the relation between variety and scarcity, 
and how preferences for one influence the other.  
Another limitation concerns the shift to using consumable items in Studies 6 and 7. It is 
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possible that the lower levels of variety selections made in Studies 6-7 are a result of asking 
participants to select among consumable vs. durable items. Recall that the items used in Studies 
1-5 were unfamiliar novel items with unknown functions, whereas the items used in Studies 6-7 
were familiar food items. This shift in item category could have contributed to the overall 
decrease in variety selections, as subsequent units of similar food items arguably offer more 
utility than subsequent units of durable items (e.g., you cannot eat again a carrot you have 
already eaten, but you can use again a pen that you have used previously). Future work should 
directly compare scarcity and variety selections across product categories (e.g., consumable vs. 
durable; hedonic vs. utilitarian), particularly within participants, as results from this type of study 
offer the most direct test of the effects of different types of items. For example, the addition of 
information, such as knowledge of the items, may decrease selections of varied sets given a 
priori preferences, which would be consistent with results from Studies 6-7. In contrast, the 
additional information may increase selections of scarce items given participants’ greater 
knowledge of base rates. However, before making generalizations, it would be necessary to test 
whether selections of scarce items and varied sets were influenced by item type. For example, 
participants may be more motivated to select consumable scarce items vs. durable scarce items—
because once consumed, a consumable scarce item is simply no longer available (whereas it 
might be possible to obtain a scarce durable item at a later time). Similarly, participants may be 
more motivated to vary their selection of hedonic items vs. utilitarian items, depending on which 
needs should be met at any given time. In short, the influence of scarcity and variety preferences 
on children’s decision making requires further investigation, as the present studies cannot 
directly compare selections across different item types (i.e., familiar vs. unfamiliar; consumable 
vs. durable; hedonic vs. utilitarian).  
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Beyond the type of item used, it is possible that bundling varied sets across Studies 4-7 
resulted in an attenuated variety preference. Prior work with adults shows that adults are less 
likely to select variety when selections are made simultaneously vs. sequentially (Mittelman et 
al., 2014). In Mittelman et al. (2014), for example, participants who were asked to select two 
beverages either made one choice (simultaneous; choose a set of two items—i.e., choice options 
were bundled) or two choices (sequentially; choose one item, then choose another—i.e., choice 
options were unbundled). Results revealed that participants were more likely to select variety 
when making sequential choices than when making a simultaneous choice. In Studies 4-7, an 
effect of bundling could be realized as lower values placed on sets in Studies 4-5 and fewer 
varied sets selected in Studies 6-7. In these studies, the decision to bundle was made 
strategically. By bundling items, I could shift the focus of tasks in Studies 4-5 away from making 
selections to providing valuations, allowing participants to evaluate all choice options 
irrespective of their preferred set. Sets in Studies 6-7 were bundled to allow for comparisons to 
Studies 4-5. Nonetheless, subsequent work should directly test whether children are similarly 
sensitive to the process by which a varied set is achieved. 
Another key consideration concerns the context in which participants were asked to make 
selections. For example, Ratner and Kahn (2002) found that adults select variety at higher levels 
when selections are public vs. private—due, in part, to wanting to “appear interesting.” In the 
present research, children always made selections publicly (i.e., with an experimenter present), 
whereas this was not always the case with adults. Adults made selections privately (via online 
survey) in Studies 1-3 and Study 7, and made selections publicly (in a lab space) in Studies 4-6. 
The shift toward asking adults to make public selections was instituted to make the child and 
adult tasks more comparable. Importantly, however, results from Study 7 with adults suggest that 
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the public vs. private difference was inconsequential for these tasks—similar results were 
obtained for adults tested by an experimenter in Study 6 and adults recruited via MTurk in Study 
7. Nonetheless, it would be important in subsequent work to test whether children’s selections 
are sensitive to whether others have access to their decisions. 
It is also important to note that participants were recruited from the United States. 
Children were recruited from a mid-sized Midwestern town (adults, too, in Studies 4-6), and 
given the limited representation of the sample, it is not possible to extend these findings across 
cultures, or even across contexts within the U.S. As Kim and Drolet (2003) found, levels of 
variety seeking differed cross-culturally—adults born in the United States (a historically more 
individualistic culture) sought more variety (as assessed via switching choice rules) than adults 
born in Korea (a historically more collectivist culture) who were living in the United States. Kim 
and Drolet reasoned that this difference was due to cultural motivations to either be unique 
(consistent with individualistic tendencies) or similar (consistent with collectivistic tendencies). 
Similarly, Kim and Markus (1999) found that selection of “unique” (i.e., scarce) items (e.g., 
uncommon- vs. common-colored pens) also differed cross-culturally. In their study, European 
American participants selected unique items more than Asian and Asian-American participants. 
Kim and Markus concluded that selections of items (e.g., scarce vs. non-scarce) reflect cultural 
norms more than characteristics of individual items (i.e., pen color), as selections offer one way 
through which people can express their culture. For this reason, Kim and Markus argued that the 
differences in selections across European American and Asian/Asian-American samples reflect 
adherence to different cultural norms. European Americans expressed endorsement of 
individualism through selecting unique items whereas Asian and Asian-American participants 
endorsed collectivism via selecting more abundant items.  
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Beyond cultural influences, choices of scarcity and variety may vary as a function of 
socioeconomic status, perhaps due to differential opportunities to save for the future vs. 
maximize opportunities for resources in the moment. For example, if an individual has few 
resources, they may prefer to choose additional units of items that they need at the present 
moment, forgoing the opportunity to select more varied items in anticipation of future unknown 
needs. In short, present (real) needs may trump future (possible) needs (Shah, Mullainathan, & 
Shafir, 2012; Shah, Shafir, & Mullainathan, 2015). Similarly, selecting scarce items may reflect 
an advantage associated with being able to forego more necessary abundant items. For example, 
in a context where scarce items are more costly, it may be more strategic to forego selecting a 
scarce item to obtain multiple abundant items. For this reason, it will be important for future 
work to disentangle the effects of culture and social context on both scarce-item and varied-set 
selections.  
Lastly, the present research cannot directly disentangle effects of utility maximization 
and hedging on variety selections, as it was not designed to answer this question. Understanding 
direct motivations to select variety may offer opportunities to help children make better decisions 
(e.g., selecting healthier combinations of foods, diversifying their diets, etc.). At the same time, 
however, direct motivations to select variety may lead to less optimal decision making in some 
contexts (e.g., if offered a selection of desserts, a person may be motivated to eat more dessert 
than if offered just one type). For this reason, it will be important to harness direct motivations to 
select variety appropriately to promote better decision making. More generally, knowing how 
any of these and the above issues influence children’s selections would inform how choices 
could be framed to help children. For example, if bundling influences children’s selections, 
children could be prompted to plan out snacks daily rather than weekly (which could be the case 
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should their family grocery shop weekly). If asked to select snacks on a daily basis, children may 
be more inclined to vary their selections across the week. This could lead children to try out new 
foods and diversify their diet. This type of finding would be particularly timely given the 
increased attention to leveraging variety to promote health and well-being in childhood (e.g., 
Albuquerque et al., 2017).  
Conclusions 
 The present research was designed to test children’s use of two possible fundamental 
cues to value. Across six studies, children were shown to prefer and value variety across 
different items and choice contexts, whereas scarce items were relatively not preferred. When 
testing the strength and limits of a variety preference, I observed a shift away from variety when 
one item was preferred to another. Overall, results from these seven studies reveal that children 
as young as 4-5 years are directly motivated to select variety, that scarcity may not be inherently 
valued (at least in a non-competitive context with novel items), and that even children use variety 
as a strategy absent strong preferences to guide selections. With much work ahead, this area of 
research offers unique opportunities for researchers to greatly contribute to our understanding of 
not only the origins of value but also the developing child consumer. 
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